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 Historically, the educational community has assumed that with the existing 
resources school districts could maintain their financial stability.  Within the past decade, 
we have found that these expectations are not true, as many districts have found their 
resources insufficient to accomplish their objectives.  Currently, there are no studies in 
Texas of school districts’ decision-making processes that have contributed to 
‘substandard’ fiscal ratings from the Texas Education Agency.  Nor have there been 
studies of school districts that have emerged from such ratings.   
The purpose of this study was to describe the context within which financial 
decisions were made and the decision-making processes regarding resource allocation in 
two school districts in Texas.  The focus was on identifying factors that have contributed 
to fiscal insolvency and those which have promoted fiscal solvency. This study was 
qualitative in nature in that it examined two cases of school districts that received 
‘substandard’ fiscal ratings from the Texas Education Agency and subsequently emerged 
from those ratings.  A quantitative application of four financial ratios was utilized to 
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ensure the selected schools met the criteria.  The content analysis of interview data was 
supported by an analysis of primary documents such as board minutes and audits.  The 
respondents that were interviewed included the current superintendent, business manager, 
and TEA representative of the districts.   
The research focused on those contextual conditions, including changes in the law 
governing taxes and allocation of monies, and the fiscal decisions that have resulted in 
districts becoming fiscally insolvent and then regaining solvency.  The theoretical 
framework of the research included budgetary decision-making models and their 
application to public school budgeting.   
The research suggests that the financial problems in each district were severe, yet 
incremental.  The contributing factors included a lack of financial leadership and 
knowledge as well poor communication based on inadequate budgetary decision-making 
models. 
This research further develops scholarship in terms of fiscal recovery.  
Recommendations are made for school boards, superintendents and financial officers in 
individual school districts.  The findings should allow education policy makers to 
understand and possibly preempt fiscal problems in their jurisdictions. 
 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 
 Introduction 1  
 Statement of Problem 5 
 Purpose of the Study 6 
 Research Questions 7 
 Methodology 7 
 Significance of the Study 8 
 Definition of Terms 9 
 Assumptions 19 
 Limitations of the Study 19 
 Delimitations of the Study 20 
 Summary 20 
 
CHAPTER II REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 Introduction 21 
 Public Budgets 22 
 Budget Decision Making Theories 25 
 Background:  Evolution of Texas School Finance (1836-Present)  28 
 Review of School Finance Litigation 36 
 Review of School Finance Litigation in Texas 40 
 Review of Fiscal Accountability Legislation in Texas 42 
  Texas Performance Review 45 
  Senate Bill 218 46 
 Texas Education Agency Fiscal Tools 48 
 The Concept of Bankruptcy and Distress 51 
 The Stability of Publicly Funded Institutions 55 
 Predicting Fiscal Distress in the Corporate World 56 
 Predicting Fiscal Distress in the Educational World 57 
 Summary 60 
 
CHAPTER III DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 Introduction 62 
 Conceptual Framework 63 
 Methodologies 66 
 The Use of Qualitative Research 66 
 Selection of Cases 69 
 Interview Methodology 70 
 Field Testing Interview Questions 72 
 Content Analysis of Documents 73 
 Treatment and Data Analysis 73 
 Validity and Reliability 74 




CHAPTER IV PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA 
 Introduction 77 
 Cedar Hill Independent School District 
 Financial Ratios 77 
 Background Information 80 
 District Mission Statement 83 
 Expenditures 84 
 Historical Summary 87 
 Organizational Plan 89 
 On-Site Interviews 91 
 Analysis 91 
 Thematic Responses 93 
 Summary 104 
 Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District 
 Financial Ratios 106 
 Background Information 108 
 District Mission Statement 111 
 Expenditures 112 
 Historical Summary 114 
 Organizational Plan 118 
 On-Site Interviews 118 
 Analysis 118 
 Thematic Responses 121  
 Summary 134 
 
CHAPTER V SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Summary 136 
 Cedar Hill Independent School District 137 
 Uvalde Consolidated School District 138 
 Conclusions 139 
 Warning Signs of Financial Distress 140 
 Conclusions of Decision Making Models 141 
 Recommendations 142 
 Recommendations for Further Research 143 
 
APPENDIX A 145 
APPENDIX B 146 
APPENDIX C 147 
REFERENCES 148 






The American tradition that education is a state not a national function stems from 
the 10th amendment to the United States Constitution.  Although it is not specifically 
mentioned in the document, the court system over the years has inferred that education is 
a national interest and a state responsibility.   Perhaps this viewpoint is rooted in the 
American idea of rugged individualism, self-determination or, that all education is local. 
Yet, in any case, this notion of state responsibility for education has experienced an 
evolution in the basic structure of allocation and distribution of resources used to finance 
public schooling.  In many states, this process for funding has gradually shifted from the 
broad shoulders of state generated revenues, to the over burdened backs of the local 
property owners.   
The financing of schools has changed dramatically during the past 30 years. The 
largest component of change has been in per pupil expenditures in public elementary and 
secondary schools.  This has been primarily as a result of expanded services provided by 
the schools. These services include more expensive specialized classes for high school 
students, compensatory education for students from disadvantaged backgrounds, special 
education and related services for students with disabilities, and desegregation efforts all 
contributed to increased costs.  Also, efforts to improve funding equity and the political 
systems governing schools contribute to these increased expenditures.  Furthermore, the 
additional money represents the coverage of higher costs for health and other insurance, 
pay for increased utility costs, and to raise salaries.  Murray, Evans, and Schwab (1997) 
 
 2 
suggest that increased school spending comes not from reallocating existing resources but 
from expanding the total resources available through taxation. 
As a result of both litigation and the desire for property tax relief, state 
governments have acquired greater control over school funding decisions while reducing 
its percentage of support coming from the state. In an environment of fend for yourself 
federalism (Gold, 1989) the various levels of government including school districts are 
forced to face many unfunded mandates on the federal and state levels.  The problem 
with K-12 public school funding in the United States is that schools are expected to do 
more – educate more students, increase performance standards, offer more diverse and 
appropriate curriculum and programs – with less funding (Rothstein, 2002).  Ironically, 
while teachers are being asked to meet ambitious new academic targets, local school 
district spending patterns have changed very little in the past three decades (Miles, 2001).  
Economic theory explains this phenomenon as scarcity.  Specifically, a world of limited 
resources attempting to satisfy unlimited human wants. 
Overall, about half of school funding in Texas comes from general state revenues 
and federal grants; the rest comes from local money, primarily property taxes. In fact, the 
state’s share of school funding has been slipping for the past 12 years.  In 1990-91, the 
state share was 47 percent.  By 2002-03 it was 39.7 percent.  By 2005, the state share of 
school funding is estimated be 36.3 percent (http://www.investintexasschools.org, 2005).  
But on the district level, that split varies widely. The property poor areas of El Paso and 
the wealthy suburbs of Dallas and Houston are in stark contrast. Some districts, flush 
with property taxes, get no state aid. Others depend heavily on state money.  To offset 
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this local variation the state provides funding to districts in an inverse relationship to 
district wealth.  Schools districts with higher property wealth receive less funding than 
low wealth school districts to equalize overall school funding. 
Thus, it is necessary for the legislature to raise tax rates to furnish the same levels 
of services.  As school districts approach the 1.50 per $100 property valuation cap, the 
ability of school districts to provide adequate and equitable facilities may be threatened.   
In a market economy this disproportion of inputs and outputs would be accommodated 
through the rationing effect of the price system.  It is when government places price 
ceilings that distortions of the natural dynamics of pricing occur and unstable economic 
environments are created.  When districts reach the maximum tax rate, they may need to 
cut programs and lay off personnel to continue to meet rising costs, such as higher 
teacher salaries and health care benefits.  Reliable data show that Texas’ public education 
system is at 97 percent fiscal capacity.  The percentage is projected to increase to 98 or 
even 99 in the near future (A Report Card on Texas Education, 2002). 
Currently, the Texas Education Agency (TEA) projections indicate that 
approximately 100 Texas school districts will have serious financial problems in the 
upcoming year (Albanese, 2002).  Of these districts, 71 districts were classified with a 
‘substandard’ fiscal rating in the initial Financial Integrity Rating System of Texas (TEA, 
2000).  A public school district’s progression into financial insolvency is often caused by 
financial exigencies, which include but are not limited to:  expenditures exceeding 
revenues, declining fund balance, stagnant tax rate, declining enrollment, declining 
property values or error.  School finance exists in an economic environment. The 
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consequences of a districts failure to respond to any of these conditions could force 
consolidation or put the district into state receivership due to insolvency. Yet, the 
ramifications could be more widespread because during periods of economic downturns 
state revenues become uncertain.  Even if state allocations remain constant, school 
districts experiencing growth in student enrollment may find themselves in financial 
difficulties.  Some contend that this method of financing public education is merely a 
symptom of a larger state wide financial crisis.  Yet, there are researchers who have 
asserted that there are indicators and fiscal tools that could be utilized to both identify 
economic distress and restructure school district insolvency. 
The structure of school finance decisions exists in an unpredictable political 
environment.  Local control creates a setting that often makes decision making appear 
incremental, influenced by special interests and fluid participators in the decision making 
process. A practical decision making model for leaders to resolve these issues, requires 
rational analysis based on purposed guided choices that result in the best alternatives to 
meet their respective goals.  
The reality of the world of the 21st Century leader will be one of competition for 
dollars and customers.  The role of the future superintendent will not only entail running 
a school system but also serving as a broker of services and an ensurer of equity 
(Houston, 2001). His/her task will be to determine which services are required and 
strategies that will make sure every child will benefit from them.  The responsibility of 
budgeting cannot be delegated to others (Butler, 2003).  The success of leaders in terms 
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of budgeting will be grounded in their abilities to utilize rational decision-making in a 
world of environmental uncertainty. 
The question of how school districts deal with financial insolvency has largely 
been ignored by the literature.  The literature that there is suggests that due to a general 
lack of knowledge, school district resort to cost-reduction methodologies that are not cost 
effective, or are quick fixes, and unrealistic; the process often mirrors state and federal 
surgery with a blunt scalpel (Cavanagh, 2002).  The focus of this study will be on case 
studies of two school districts in Texas who have emerged from financial insolvency 
through their approaches to decision-making. 
Statement of the Problem 
Lincoln and Guba (1981) suggest that a problem is a state of affairs “resulting 
from the interaction of two or more factors…that yields an undesirable consequences…” 
(p.88). Currently, there is an ever-demanding strain that is placed on state governmental 
resources and an ever-decreasing ability to generate local revenue.  As a result an 
increasing number of school districts have not maintained their financial stability and 
have become fiscally insolvent.  Insolvency is defined as obligating fiscal resources 
beyond available resources.  The consequences of such a ranking can produce political 
and economic restructuring of the organization.  
Historically, the educational community has assumed that with the existing 
resources school districts could maintain their financial stability.  Within the past decade, 
we have found that these expectations are not true, as many districts have found their 
resources insufficient to accomplish their objectives.  Currently, there are no studies in 
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Texas of school districts’ decision-making processes that have contributed to 
‘substandard’ fiscal ratings from the Texas Education Agency.  Nor have there been 
studies of school districts that have emerged from such ratings.  The focus will be on 
identifying factors that have contributed to fiscal insolvency and those which have 
promoted fiscal solvency. 
Purpose of the Study 
The 77th Legislative Session of the State of Texas directed the commissioner of 
education, in consultation of the Comptroller’s office, to”…develop and implement a 
financial accountability rating system for school districts in this state (Canby, 2001).  In 
response to this directive, the Texas Education Agency (TEA) developed the Financial 
Integrity Rating System of Texas (FIRST), which was implemented for the first time in 
2002-03 school year using 2001-02 data.  The mandatory data collection required by the 
Texas Education Agency combined with the development of uniform criteria and 
standards to identify school districts in fiscal distress, now allows researchers to explore 
the many technical variables of school finance and their relationship to the economic 
health of Texas school districts.  In doing so the legislature has compelled school districts 
into a higher state of financial accountability in order to avoid politically embarrassing 
school district insolvency and to conserve precious state revenues. 
The researcher identified selected school districts, which have experienced 
‘substandard ratings’ by the Texas Education Agency and have emerged or made 
substantial progress toward regaining fiscal solvency.  Furthermore, the purpose of the 
study was to describe the context within which budgetary decisions were made and the 
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decision-making processes regarding resource allocation.  The focus was on identifying 
factors that have contributed to fiscal insolvency and those which have promoted fiscal 
solvency. 
Research Questions 
(1) What were the factors that contributed to the districts’ fiscal insolvency? 
(2) What were the factors contributing to the districts’ regaining fiscal solvency? 
(3) Were the fiscal tools of the Texas Education Agency used in resolving the 
problem?  
Methodology 
This study was qualitative in nature in that it examined two cases of school 
districts that have received ‘substandard’ fiscal ratings from the Texas Education Agency 
and subsequently emerged from those ratings.  A quantitative application of four 
financial ratios will be utilized to ensure the selected schools meet the criteria.  The 
content analysis of interview data was supported by an analysis of primary documents 
such as board minutes and audits.  The respondents that were interviewed include the 
current superintendent, business manager, school board member and a TEA 
representative.  This qualitative case study was written from a constructivist paradigm. 
The cases included in this study were Cedar Hill Independent School District and 
Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District.  The content analysis of interview data 
was supported by an analysis of primary documents for each case.  The inconsistencies 
between documents and interview information was noted and reported.  Each case was 
organized chronologically and presented as a narrative. 
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Additionally, a quantitative analysis was performed by the researcher through the 
application of four financial ratios to each district to further support the reliability of the 
study.  Also, these ratios were used to depict the rational relationships of budgetary items 
towards economic recovery.  A final chapter includes cross-case analysis, implications, 
conclusions and recommendations. 
Significance of the Study 
At the present time, there are few research studies addressing the issue of school 
district fiscal recovery in terms of the dynamics of choice.  Research on school district 
insolvency has focused on using financial ratios and discriminate function analysis 
developed for school districts.  These data from school district’s annual financial reports 
has been analyzed to predict the fiscal health of a school district, (Saul, 1995), and on 
developing a model for predicting fiscal insolvency (Finkelstein, 1994).  Only the Manca 
(1997) case studies of California and Nevada schools deviated from the quantitative 
nature. 
This study sought to examine the decision making and perspectives of 
stakeholders in two school districts in Texas that have been classified as substandard and 
have either emerged or made substantial progress toward regaining fiscal solvency.  The 
researcher sought to find the following:  economic conditions; fiscal decisions; and 
changes in law that have aided these school districts to regain solvency.  Furthermore, the 
study will assist education policy makers to examine and possibly anticipate problems 
within their jurisdiction.   It has been suggested by Finkelstein that case study research 
might investigate whether the differences in fiscal stability are more attributable to 
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spending patterns or to differences in governance (Finkelstein, 1994).  One of the benefits 
of qualitative research is that it can generate information about organizational activities 
and therefore, become increasingly proactive.  Thus, decision makers could be enabled to 
design strategies for avoiding potential fiscal problems before they become serious 
(Herndon & Kreps, 1993).  
Qualitative research furnishes data for diagnosing and designing strategies to 
address organizational difficulties. In addition, this study with its case analysis will be 
useful in attempting to understand which particular components of budgeting practices 
contribute to fiscal stress and which helped to solve problems in the cases studied.  Such 
practices as allocation decisions, staff discretion, error resolution, technical expertise, 
communications, and historical patterns of control may emerge as contributors to the 
fiscal health of the school districts studied. 
Definitions 
For the purpose of this study the following terms are defined as they relate to this 
study. 
Assessed Valuation:  Assessed Valuation refers to a valuation set upon real 
property by the County Appraisal District to be used as a basis for levying taxes. 
Audit:  An audit is a comprehensive review of the manner in which the 
government’s resources were actually utilized.  A certified public accountant 
issues an opinion over the presentation of financial statements, tests the controls 




Average Daily Attendance, ADA:  The average daily attendance, ADA, is the 
average number of students who are either present or who have been excused for 
absence during each day of the school year.  The ADA figure is used to calculate 
a school district’s principal apportionment. 
Beginning Fund Balance:  The General Fund balance on the first day of a new 
school year.  For most school districts this is equivalent to the fund balance at the 
end of the previous school year. 
Budget:  The projected financial data for the current school year.  Budget data are 
collected for the general fund, food service fund, and debt service fund. 
Budgeting:  Not later than August 20 of each year, the superintendent (or 
designee) must prepare a budget for the school district if the fiscal year begins on 
September 1. (For those districts with fiscal years beginning July 1, this date 
would be June 20.)  The budget must be adopted before expenditures can be 
made, and this adoption must be prior to the setting of the tax rate for the budget 
year.  The budget must be itemized in detail according to classification and 
purpose of expenditure, and must be prepared according to the rules and 
regulations established by the state board of education. 
Capital Outlay:  This term is used as both a Function and an Object.  Expenditures 
for land, buildings, and equipment are covered under Object 6600.  The amount 




Capital Project Funds:  Fund type used to account for financial resources to be 
used for the acquisition or construction of major capital facilities (other than those 
financed by proprietary funds and trust funds.) 
Case Study:  A case study is an in-depth, multifaceted investigation, using 
qualitative research methods, of a single social phenomenon (Feagin, Orum & 
Sjoberg, 1991).  A case may be identified as a person, event, time period, critical 
incident, decision or set of decisions, organization, process, program or institution 
(Yin, 1994). 
Cash:  The term, as used in connection with cash flows reporting, includes not 
only currency on hand, but also demand deposits with banks or other financial 
institutions.  Cash also includes deposits in other kinds of accounts or cash 
management pools that have the general characteristics of demand deposit 
accounts in that the governmental enterprise may deposit additional cash at any 
time and also effectively may withdraw cash at any time without prior notice or 
penalty. 
Categorical Funds:  Categorical Funds are money given to a school district by the 
state or federal government for specific purposes.  These funds usually have 
specified guidelines and limitations on how they are to be expended. 
Chapter 41:  A key “equity” chapter in the Texas Education Code (TEC) is 
Chapter 41.  This chapter is devoted to wealth equalization through the 
mechanism of recapture, the recovery of financial resources from districts defined 
by the state as high property wealth.  Resources are recovered for the purpose of 
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sharing them with low-wealth districts.  Districts that are subject to the provisions 
of Chapter 41 must make a choice among several options in order to reduce their 
property wealth and share financial resources. 
Comptroller Certified Property Value:  The district’s total taxable property value 
as certified by the Comptroller’s Property Tax Division (Comptroller Valuation). 
Debt Service Fund:  Debt Service Fund is a governmental fund with budgetary 
control that accounts for expenditures for the retirement of debt and expenditures 
for interest on debt, except principle and interest of current loans. 
Debt Services:  Two function areas (70 and 71) and one Object (6500) are 
identified using this terminology “debt services.”  Function 70 is a major 
functional area that is used for expenditures that are used for the payment of debt 
principal and interest including Function 71.  Expenditures that are for the 
retirement of recurring bond, capital lease principal, and other debt, related debt 
service fees, and for all debt interest fall under Function 71.  Object 6500 covers 
all expenditures for debt service. 
Deferred Revenue:  Resource inflows that do not yet meet the criteria for revenue 
recognition.  Unearned amounts are always reported as deferred revenue.  In 
governmental funds, earned amounts also are reported as deferred revenue until 
they are available to liquidate liabilities of the current period. 
Deficit Spending:  Deficit spending by a school district refers to having 
insufficient allocation of actual or projected income when compared to the actual 
or projected school district expenditures. 
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Designated Fund Balance:  The designated fund balance represents tentative plans 
for the future use of financial resources.  Designations require Board action to 
earmark fund balance for bona fide purposes that will be fulfilled within a 
reasonable period of time. 
Discriminate Function Analysis, DFA:  Discriminate Function Analysis, is a 
statistical technique based on multiple regression that allows multiple numbers of 
continuous independent variables to be combined in such a manner as to form a 
discriminate function equation that will predict the membership of the sample 
elements into their nominal categories. 
Existing Debt Allotment (EDA):  The EDA program was initially authorized by 
the 76th Legislature in 1999.  The EDA program provides assistance to school 
districts in making debt service payments on qualifying debt. 
Fiscal Insolvency:  For the purpose of this study, fiscal insolvency means 
obligating fiscal resources beyond available resources. 
Effective Tax Rate:  Provides the unit with approximately the same amount of 
revenue it had the year before on properties taxes in both years.  A comparison of 
the effective tax rate to the taxing unit’s proposed tax rate shows if there will be a 
tax increase. 
Ending Fund Balance:  The amount of unencumbered surplus reported by the 
district at the end of the specified school year.  For most school districts this will 
be equivalent to the fund balance at the beginning of the next school year. 
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Expenditures:  The cost of goods delivered or services rendered, whether paid or 
unpaid including expenses, provisions for debt retirement not reported as a 
liability of the fund from which retired and capital outlays. 
Fiscal Year:  A period of 12 consecutive months legislatively selected as a basis 
for annual financial reporting, planning, and budgeting.  The fiscal year may run 
September 1 through August 31 or July 1 through June 30. 
Foundation School Program (FSP) Status:  The Foundation School Program 
(FSP) is the shared financial arrangement between the state and the school 
district, where property taxes are blended with revenues from the state to cover 
the cost of basic and mandated programs.  The nature of this arrangement falls in 
one of the following status categories:  Regular, Special Statutory, State 
Administered, Education Service Center, or Open Enrollment Charter School 
District. 
Fund Balance:  The difference between assets and liabilities reported in a 
governmental fund. 
General Fund:  The General Fund is used to account for revenues and 
expenditures necessary for the day-to-day operation of the school district. 
I&S Tax Rate:  The tax rate calculated to provide the revenues needed to cover 
Interest and Sinking (I&S) (also referred to as Debt Service).  I&S include the 
interest and principal on bonds and other debt secured by property tax revenues. 
Local Fund Assignment Rate:  The district's share of Tier 1 cost, is the amount of 
revenue that can be raised at the $0.86 tax rate. Districts with sufficient wealth to 
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generate the entire allotment on their own at the $0.86 tax rate receive no state aid 
in Tier 1. 
Local Tax:  This is all revenues from local real and personal property taxes, 
including recaptured funds from 1) Contracted Instructional Services Between 
Public Schools (Function 91) and 2) Incremental Costs associated with Chapter 
41 of the Texas Education Code (Function 92). 
M&O Tax Rate:  The tax rate calculated to provide the revenues needed to cover 
Maintenance and Operations (M&O).  M&O includes such things as salaries, 
utilities, and day-to-day operations. 
Operating Expenditures:  A wide variety of expenditures necessary to a district’s 
operations fall into this category with largest portion going to payroll and related 
employee benefits and the purchase of goods and services. 
Operating Expenditures/Student:  Total Operating Expenditures divided by the 
total number of enrolled students. 
PEIMS:  A statewide data management system for public education information 
in the State of Texas.  One of the basic goals of PEIMS, as adopted by the State 
Board of Education in 1986, is to improve education practices of local school 
districts.  The Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS) 
contains only the data necessary for the legislature and the Texas Education 
Agency (TEA) to perform their legally authorized functions in overseeing public 
education.  PEIMS encompasses all data requested and received by TEA about 
public education, including student demographic and academic performance, 
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personnel, financial, and organizational information.  School districts submit their 
data via standardized computer files. These are defined in a yearly publication, the 
PEIMS Data Standards. 
Plant Maintenance & Operations:  The amount spent on the maintenance and 
operation of the physical plant and grounds and for warehousing and receiving 
services.  Expenditures associated with this functional area are reported under 
Function 51. 
Property/Refined ADA:  The district’s Comptroller Certified Property Value 
divided by its total Refined ADA. 
Property/WADA:  The district’s Comptroller Certified Property Value divided by 
its total WADA. 
Recapture:  Recapture is a feature of school finance where local districts give the 
state locally collected tax revenue for redistribution through the Foundation 
School Program (FSP).  The recapture provision in Chapter 41 of the Texas 
Education Code is a salient feature of the Texas school finance equalization 
system. 
Refined ADA:  Refined Average Daily Attendance (also called RADA) is based 
on the number of days of instruction in the school year.  The aggregate eligible 
days attendance is divided by the number of days of instruction to compute the 
refined average daily attendance. 
Reserve Fund Balance:  This is that portion of fund equity, which is not available 
for appropriation or has been legally separated for a specific purpose. 
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Revenues:  Any increase in a school district’s financial resources from property 
taxes, foundation fund entitlements, user charges, grants, and other sources.  
Revenues fall into three broad sources of revenues:  Local & Intermediate; State; 
and Federal. 
Rollback Rate:  The rollback rate is a tax rate that would provide roughly the 
same local taxes and state aid per WADA as was available the previous year, plus 
debt service taxes, and $0.06. 
School Bonds:  A school bond is a debt issued by a school district through a 
public bond sale for which the school district has secured a voter levy by which to 
pay the debt. 
School Year:  The twelve months beginning September 1 of one year and ending 
August 31 of the following year or beginning July 1 and ending June 30.  Districts 
now have two options. 
Special Revenue Fund:  A governmental fund type used to account for the 
proceeds of specific revenue sources (other than for major capital projects) that 
are legally restricted to expenditures for specified purposes. 
State Revenues:  Revenues realized from the Texas Education Agency, other state 
agencies, shared service arrangements, or allocated on the basis of state laws 
relating to the Foundation School Program Act.  This amount is recorded as 
Revenue Object 5800. 
 
 18 
Tier 1:  The combination of state and local funds provides access to the same 
level of educational resources at the same tax rate.  All revenue within Tier 1 is 
equalized. 
Tier 2:  Tier 2 provides substantially equal access to resources at substantially 
equal tax rates.  The Tier 2 calculation provides additional funding to school 
districts with low property values to equalize the revenue per WADA available at 
a given tax rate.  Not all revenue within Tier 2 is equalized. 
Undesignated Fund Balance:  This is that portion of fund equity that is currently 
available to finance expenditures not already approved by the Board of Trustees. 
Undesignated Unreserved Fund Balances:  Available expendable financial 
resources in a governmental fund that are not the object of tentative management 
plans (i.e., designations).  One primary criterion of rating agencies for school 
bonds is the relative amount of undesignated unreserved fund balance.  Bond 
rating agencies view undesignated unreserved fund balances as a reflection of the 
financial strength of school districts and show concern when district fund 
balances decrease. 
Unfunded Debt:  Unfunded debt such as revenue bonds, loans for capital 
improvement projects, capital leases, unamoritized retirement benefits or 
insurance funds, and accrued vacation pay are the encumbrance of debt by a 
school district for which no voter approved levy has been approved.  Such debt 
must be repaid by the school district through its own resources and may threaten 
the financial position of its general fund. 
 
 19 
WADA:  A Weighted Average Daily Attendance (WADA) is used to measure the 
extent students are participating in special programs.  The concept of WADA is 
effect converts all of a school district’s students with their different weights to a 
calculated number of regular students required to raise the same amount of 
revenue.  The greater the number of students eligible for special entitlements, the 
greater a school district’s WADA will be. 
Assumptions 
The issues involved in this study were very complex and they required an 
approach that allowed for discourse between the researcher and respondents to better 
understand the prior conditions and decisions that led to the fiscal problems of each 
school district.  The number of school districts suggested by a panel of experts and Texas 
Education Agency database was small allowing the researcher to conduct qualitative case 
studies. 
Other assumptions included: 
1. It was assumed that school districts prepare and report financial data 
accurately, uniformly, and truthfully. 
Limitations of the Study 
The following limitations are inherent in the study: 




Delimitations of the Study 
This study involved only school districts that were identified by a panel of experts 
on school finance as having experienced a substandard rating by the Texas Education 
Agency since the ratings inception and which have recovered or are in the process of 
substantial recovery from fiscal insolvency. 
Summary 
The remainder of this study is organized into four chapters.  Chapter Two 
represents a review of the literature related to budgeting, decision-making models, school 
finance legislation and litigation, and fiscal distress.  The review concentrates on these 
topics in the framework of the state of Texas. 
Chapter Three describes the methodology and procedures used to investigate the 
research questions presented in Chapter One.  Chapter Four documents the findings of the 
study for each research question.  Chapter Four also furnishes an analysis and evaluation 
of these findings. 
Finally, Chapter Five provides a summary of the research, the findings, 









CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Public school finance is one of the most discussed and least understood aspects of 
public education (Odden & Picus, 1992).  Understanding public school finance in Texas 
requires knowledge of its historical context and an understanding of issues of adequacy 
and equity (Alexander & Salmon, 1995).  The annual property tax bill and occasional 
letter to the editor constitutes many Texans’ working knowledge of public school finance.  
A closer look at adequacy issues reveals terminology such as funding tiers, weighted 
allotments and wealth sharing formulas inherent in school finance.  These often leave the 
average public stunned and perplexed, struggling to translate the political and economic 
rhetoric that often finds basis in irrational resource allocation strategies. 
The historical picture of school finances in Texas was one that was laden with 
conflict.  This struggle involved local and state governments, changing legislative and 
judicial mandates, periods of turbulent systemic changes as well as conflicting 
perceptions regarding the impact of school finance decisions on educational processes 
and outcomes.  Walker and Kirby (1988) describe the history of the public school finance 
system as one of slow development marked by inequities and intermittent crisis.  Public 
perception of the Texas school finance system has ranged from extreme optimism to 
fortified resolve to unconcealed cynicism.  “School finance reform in Texas was like a 
Russian novel:  it’s long, tedious, and everyone dies in the end”(Yudof, 1992). 
This chapter focuses on related literature, which explores the following:  1) public 
budgeting defined; 2) budgetary decision making models; 3) history of the Texas public 
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school finance system; 4) the structure of the current educational finance system and 5)   
major changes resulting from recent legislative and judicial actions.  Literature that 
furnished an overview of accountability models and standards of fiscal distress for Texas 
school districts are explored.  There is a focus on the concept of bankruptcy as it applies 
to corporate and educational worlds.  A review was then made of models used in both 
private industry and in public education to predict insolvency of school districts.  Finally, 




The term budgeting suggests a variety of interrelated concepts in the resource 
allocation process.  Hence, a specific and comprehensive definition is difficult.  In the 
literature, several definitions are given, each of which may be accurate, depending on the 
individual’s perspective.  In its simplest form, “A budget is the financial expression of the 
intended activities of an organization or a government” (Premchand, 1998, p. 25).  In a 
very general sense, Wildavsky and Caiden (1997) described budgeting as a process 
“concerned with translating financial resources into human purposes.  It is a series of 
goals with price tags attached to it” (p. 125).  Several other budgetary viewpoints also 
exist.  For example, both Kramer (1979) and Stedry (1960) furnished very comprehensive 
explanations.  They described a budget as a multipurpose document providing an 
estimate of future costs, and outlining a systematic plan for utilization of manpower, 
material and other resources.  Lynch (1979) offered an excellent operational definition 
applicable to administration of public affairs. 
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Budget is a plan for the accomplishment of programs related to objectives 
and goals within a definite time period, including an estimate of resources 
required together with an estimate of the resources available, usually 
compared with one or more past periods and showing future requirements 
(p.5). 
 
Agryris (1954) described the budget as a “fiscal goal, a production challenge in 
industry” (p.15) and a constant reminder a goal has to be met.  Thus, he argued, budgets 
are constant motivating factors, a perspective Mintzberg (1994) has since questioned.  
For Mintzberg, the budget is designed for organizational control and less for motivation.   
Smithies (1955) contended every governmental decision has budgetary 
implications since the process of decision-making almost invariably involves allocation 
of scarce resources among alternatives.  He identified six decision-making stages through 
which budgetary functions are reflected.  These stages include determination of policy 
objectives, planning, programming, budget formulation, budget execution and budget 
review. 
According to Lee and Johnson (1973), budgets in public agencies often assume 
additional purposes.   Budgets that are determined by the prevailing political, social, and 
economic conditions of the day become the government’s resource allocation strategy.  
Kraan (1996) supported this viewpoint in his assumption that budgetary decisions are the 
output of the political system, a function of the environment and the system’s 
characteristics.  Musgrave (1959) outlined what he regarded as the most fundamental 
functions of public budgeting:  to secure adjustments in the allocation of resources, 
distribute income and wealth, and secure economic stability.  The process of “who gets 
what, when, and how” characterizes an environment Wanat (1978) called “plain and 
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simple politics” (p. 10).  Also, the political tendency toward extravagance in a democracy 
often influences core budgetary decisions, as well as the decision makers in the budgetary 
process (Cyert, 1975). 
Drake and Roe (1994) defined a school budget as “the translation of prioritized 
educational needs into a financial plan which is interpreted to the public in such a way 
that when formally adopted it expresses the kind of educational program the community 
is willing to support, financially and morally, for a one-year period” (p. 70). Furthermore, 
these authors claimed the benefits of budgeting in an educational setting to be the 
following: 
(1) Budgeting establishes a plan of action for the coming year. 
(2) Budgeting requires an appraisal of past activities in relation to planned 
activities. 
(3) Budgeting necessitates work plans. 
(4) Budgeting provides security for the administration by assuring the financing 
and approval of a year’s course of action. 
(5) Budgeting necessitates forecasting expenditures and estimating revenues. 
(6) Budgeting requires orderly planning and coordination throughout the 
organization. 
(7) Budgeting establishes a system of management controls. 
(8) Budgeting provides an orderly process of review and planning for both 
personnel and facility needs. 
(9) Budgets may serve as a public information device. 
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Budget Decision Making Theories 
The three models of budgeting focused on in this study are incrementalism, 
rational approaches and garbage can theory.  These are not the only theories of budgetary 
decision-making, but they are frequently referred to in the budget literature (Thurmaier & 
Willoughby, 2001). 
Incrementalism 
The literature on budgetary decisions in the public sector is dominated by the 
theory of incrementalism and its various meanings (Berry, 1990).  This theory advocates 
that policy makers use ‘rules of thumb’ in order to deal with the technical complexity of 
expenditure decisions.  Wildavsky (1964), the founder of this theory, suggests that the 
people who design the budget are concerned with relatively minute increments to an 
existing base denoted as the fair share.  Thus, it follows that budgeting is incremental to 
the extent that it results in marginal changes in expenditure.  The evidence of substantial 
annual shifts in spending would account for non-incremental budgeting. 
The influential piece that tested incrementalism was Otto et al. (1966).  These 
authors empirically tested for and found support of the regularity of expenditure changes 
in 56 federal agencies in the U.S. between 1947 and 1963.  Regularity represents the idea 
of routine behavior in expenditure decisions.  This view of incrementalism as regularity 
rather than marginality was found in the work of Dempster and Wildavsky (1979). 
Therefore, incrementalism has two core attributes – marginality and regularity in outputs. 
Lindblom (1975) asserted the incremental method is the most common through 
which public policy decisions are made.  According to Lindblom, this method is taken for 
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granted rather than formalized because it is commonly practiced.  The author stated that 
incrementalism is characterized by the practitioner’s preoccupation with the following: 
(1) A limited set of policy alternatives that are politically relevant, 
(2) Analysis of those aspects of policies with respect to which of the alternatives 
differ, 
(3) The policy choice as one in a succession of choices, 
(4) Marginal values of various social objectives and constraints, 
(5) A mixture of evaluation and empirical analysis rather than empirical analysis 
of the consequences of policies for objectives independently determined, 
(6) A small number of all the important relevant values. 
Hence, the policy maker concentrates on one or two of the many policy goals. 
They limit the alternatives and rely heavily on the record of past experiences.  This is 
safe, flexible and self-adjusting.   Therefore, the incremental administrator might lack 
innovation, insight or forethought.  Instead, they might make policy choices by reducing 
complicated problems to their simplest form and make marginal adjustments to previous 
successful budgetary decisions. 
Rational 
The second model is the rational model, which is embedded in economic theory.  
This model seeks to describe the conditions that maximize efficiency, effectiveness, and 
certainly by identifying all available options and choosing the best alternatives.  Perhaps 
the most fundamental assumption is “complete and perfect information about all 
alternatives is both available and manageable” (Lee and Johnson, 1973. p. 19). This 
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decision-making method is often cited as the best way to make public budgeting 
decisions (Lynch, 1979). 
The fundamental principle of the rational decision making model is reflective 
analysis.  In budgetary decision making, reflective analysis is essential as decisions are 
made about fiscal allocations to one activity instead of another (Key, 1940).  The rational 
administrator uses a budgetary approach that connects inputs or dollars and outputs or 
goals in the resource allocation process.  Their decisions are not random, accidental, or 
rationalized after the fact.  Resource allocation is often mathematically determined and 
evaluated by the assumption that the best possible results will be produced efficiently and 
effectively.  There are at least six rationally objective budgeting methods.  These methods 
include:  1) performance budgeting; 2) program, planning and budgeting; 3) zero-base 
budgeting; 4) formula budgeting; 5) mission budgeting and 6) strategic budgeting. 
Garbage Can 
The garbage can theory was first developed by Cohen et al. (1972) to describe 
decision-making in colleges.  It articulates that these educational institutions face 
decision situations involving unclear goals, unclear technology, and fluid participants.  In 
this model, active decision-makers and problems follow one another through a series of 
choices without great progress in solving problems.  Some of the organized anarchical 
features of this model have been revised and extended to public institutions in general 
(Kingdon, 1984).   
The most important feature of the garbage can theory involves four independent 
streams of decision-making:  1) problems; 2) solutions; 3) participants; and 4) choice 
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opportunities.  The organization centers on a collection of choices looking for problems.  
The decision-makers have already devised the strategies to solve the problems, but are 
waiting for the appropriate time and place to employ them.  The garbage can theory is 
founded on a radically different approach to choice than the rational model.  Its 
fundamental premise is that decisions in an organized anarchy cannot be understood 
using the intentions of organizational participants, and imposing a rational explanation on 
organizational behavior can only distort what is really going on (Bendor et al., 2001). 
The garbage can theory administrator might make choices not necessarily logical, 
but dependent upon such matters as the timing of the decision; the availability of other 
decision opportunities; and the participants at the time. 
Background:  Evolution of Texas School Finance 1836-Present 
Most Texans fail to recognize that our philosophies of education, our organizational 
structure, and particularly our financing methods for public schools were the products of 
over 150 years of evolution (Walker, 1990, p.2).  The Texas school finance system 
evolved similar to systems throughout America over the past two-plus centuries (Pierce, 
1989).  Burrup and Brimley (1998) noted that these evolutionary patterns in public school 
finance theory and practice generally fit into five distinct periods: 
1) the period of local district financial responsibility with little or no assistance 
from the state; 
2) the period of emerging state responsibility with the use of flat grants, 
subventions, and other nonequalizing state allocation to local districts; 
3) the period of emergence of the concept of a foundation program; 
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4) the period of refinement of the foundation program concept; and 
the presently emerging period of equalization practices and stress on high 
quality education (p. 133). 
Texas officials included a provision for public education in the newly formed 
Republic of Texas with the Constitution of 1836.  But it was not until the Constitution of 
1845, when Texas was admitted to the United States, that the Legislature was assigned 
the responsibility for establishing free public education throughout the newly formed 
state of Texas.  This constitution also furnished for the first funding of public education 
through the use of state taxes on property.  But “land was so abundant in Texas that it 
held little value; therefore, funds for education largely were absent” (Walker & Casey, 
1996). 
The Compromise of 1850 brought the next evolution of public education in 
Texas.  Its passage brought ten million dollars to the state for relinquishing its western 
lands.  Out of this lump sum, two million dollars plus previously appropriated but unused 
funds were used for the establishment of a permanent endowment fund for public school 
education in the School Law of 1854.  This fund’s revenues were to be distributed 
annually.  Also, this law required that counties be divided into school districts and that 
revenue sources from local governments be employed for constructing school buildings.  
The School Law of 1854 was viewed as a historic benchmark in the public school finance 
arena.  Paradoxically, the predominant number of schools in Texas was still private 
“public schools” and many Texans did not believe in the need for free public schools 
(Walker & Kirby, 1988). 
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A new constitution was designed in 1869 during the post-Civil War era.  The 
most highly centralized system for public education was mandated for Texas in this 
document.  The Permanent School Fund was revived and also an Available School Fund 
was initiated.  The Constitution of 1869 made for compulsory school attendance for the 
first time in Texas history for all children eight to fourteen.  There was an intense 
controversy, which arose over the provisions regarding local property taxes and the 
required districting of counties.  Controversy and animosity over these issues continued 
to exist among Texans for several decades (Walker & Casey, 1996). 
A new Texas constitution was developed in 1876 due to the significant opposition 
to its predecessor.  A new education article was added in the Constitution of 1876, which 
provided for financing public school education through a flat per capital grant.  This grant 
was to originate from the Available School Fund and would consist of income from the 
Permanent School Fund coupled with a maximum of one-fourth of the general revenue 
collected from the state.  Montgomery (1993) stated that one of the provisions in the 1876 
Constitution forbade school districts in rural areas from levying and collecting local 
school taxes (p. 14).  The result was a disparity of resources within the Texas public 
school system. 
The first major legislative action of the 20th Century to furnish additional support 
to rural schools came in the form of an appropriation made by the 1915 Texas 
Legislature.  This came in the form of $1 million per year for the next biennium (1916-
1917) for rural school equalization aid and was a result of Governor James E. Ferguson’s 
campaign promise.  The legislature acknowledged that rural school districts were 
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incapable of raising adequate funds even with the equalization of taxing capacities called 
for through a 1908 amendment to the Constitution.  In 1919 the Texas Legislature, with 
Governor William P. Hobby’s support, made its first appropriation from the general 
revenue fund to optimize the per-capita apportionment for Texas schools.  “The Texas 
Legislature has from 1919 forward always exercised its general appropriation authority 
for state aid grants” (Hobby & Walker, 1991, p. 380). 
The recommendations of the Gilmer-Aikin Committee brought the next major 
finance reform in Texas.  This committee was appointed by the Texas Legislature in 1947 
and was given the responsibility to organize a new system of public school finance 
(Walker & Kirby, 1988).  This committee’s proposals were documented in 1948 in a 
report entitled To Have What We Must.  These proposals established the Texas Minimum 
Foundation Program, later renamed the Foundation School Program (Watson, 1996).  
These programs designated that the state would furnish 80 percent of the funding from 
the general revenue and allow local school districts to fund above the state level. 
Revision in state school finance was evident by 1965.  Governor John Connally, 
that same year, established an interim committee named the Governor’s Committee on 
Public School Education.  This committee released their report, The Challenge and The 
Chance, in 1968. 
This report called for a complete overhaul of public education in Texas, 
consolidation of small school districts, a more comprehensive minimum 
foundation program, and increased state funding of public education. 
unfortunately, the report and its recommendation were ignored by the 




A new governor was taking office, equalization needs in Texas school finance 
were once again ignored, and the state was moving closer to experiencing major 
ramifications regarding the neglect of equity issues in the state’s school finance practices 
(Walker & Kirby, 1988, p. 18).  These ramifications became evident in 1971 when a U.S. 
District Court, in the case of Rodriguez v. San Antonio ISD, declared the method of 
funding public education used by the state was unconstitutional based on the violation of 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution 
(Watson, 1996, p. 380).  The timeframe of 1973 to 1983 saw each legislative session 
wrestling with the task of providing more funding to poor school districts yet these 
equalization efforts had little impact. 
The problem of equalization was addressed by the state legislature at different 
intervals during this timeframe.  The Legislature in 1973 waited for a decision to come 
from the United States Supreme Court.  On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court heard 
arguments and in 1973, the Court overturned the lower court decision.  The Court stated 
that the Texas school finance system was not unconstitutional, it referred the case back to 
the state for remediation and further reiterated that education was not a fundamental right 
protected by the U.S. Constitution.  Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion for the 5-4 
decision in Rodriguez v. San Antonio (1973).  He noted that although disparities between 
school districts did exist, the state was trying to remedy the situation by creating a 
minimum foundation program.  As he stated: 
The District Court’s opinion does not reflect the novelty and complexity 
of the constitutional questions posed by appellees’ challenge to Texas’ 
system of school financing.  In concluding that strict scrutiny was 
required, that court relied on decisions dealing with the rights of indigents 
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to equal treatment in the criminal trail and appellate processes, an on cases 
disapproving wealth restrictions on the right to vote.  The cases, the 
District Court concluded, established wealth as a suspect classification.  
Finding that the local property tax system discriminated on the basis of 
wealth, it regarded those precedents as controlling.  It then reasoned…that 
there is a fundamental right to education, and that absent some compelling 
state justification, the Texas system could not stand. (pgs. 17-18) 
 
Texas was challenged within the court decision to examine its system of finance 
because it was “chaotic and unjust…the ultimate solution must come from the lawmakers 
and from democratic pressure of those who elect them (Rodriguez, p. 1310).”  The first 
level of reform began in 1975.   The state equalization aid bill was passed, and the 
method of calculating the local share of the foundation school program was modified in 
the last few hours of the session.  The bill was a “compromise measure that made notable 
revisions to the state’s financing plan (Walker & Casey, 1996, p. 10).”  It furnished the 
theoretical framework for equalization aid to property-poor districts and did away with 
the complicated economic index formulas of the Gilmer-Aikin Plan.  While Senate Bill 1, 
passed in a July 1977 special session of the Legislature, increased the foundation program 
aid while reducing the local fund share.  Also, the School Tax Assessment Practices 
Board was created to establish uniform guidelines for the appraisal of property.  In 1979, 
Senate Bill 350 again raised the foundation level of support, increased equalization aid, 
increased state compensatory funding, wrote a new transportation formula and addressed 
the needs of growing districts. 
The issue of taxpayer equity continued to be of interest.  Senate Bill 621 
and House Bill 1060 combined to provide a measure of reform in property 
taxation, including truth-in-taxation requirements, enabling of the Tax 
Relief Amendments of 1978, and establishment of countywide tax 
appraisal districts to bring uniformity and equity in property appraisals 




The 1981 Legislative session again increased the foundation program and 
equalization formulas.  Teacher salaries were the main reason for the increases.  The local 
fund assignment rate was again lowered.  While transportation aid was increased.  House 
Bill 30 passed in a special session, attempted “to clarify previous property tax legislation, 
postponed for two years mandatory school district participation in central appraisal 
districts, and added several features to the Property Tax Code” (Hair, 1989). 
Tremendous turmoil characterized the Texas school finance system in 1983.  Both 
oil and gas prices fell dramatically for the first time in many years.  This phenomenon led 
to no increase in state tax revenue with a major recession in Texas.  Thus, the state fell 
into the position of having to either raise taxes or cut spending.  Dallas businessman Ross 
Perot was chosen to chair a Select Committee on Public Education in response to this 
economic crisis.  The committee was charged with investigating the state system of 
education in Texas with a goal of reforming in a special session of the Legislature in 
1984.  The Select Committee reported its recommendations in April 1984, and its 
recommendations included the elements presented as House Bill 72 in which virtually 
every aspect of the Texas public school education system, including public school 
finance, went through major revisions (Montgomery, 1993).  House Bill 72 was a school 
reform law that attempted to avert legal disputes, yet it was inundated with considerable 
controversy.  “The main equity improvements in the state finance structure deriving from 
House Bill 72 were 
(a) increased local share rate; 
(b) increased equalization aid; and 
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(c) reduction of Available School Fund payments to budget-balanced 
districts”(Camp & Thompson, 1988, p. 226). 
Therefore, much of the responsibility for funding the delineated reforms was left to the 
local districts, with many districts not being adequately equipped to handle his financial 
burden. 
A Guide to Texas School Finance (Texas Center for Educational Research, 2003) 
describes the structure of the present Texas public school funding system as follows: 
It is a shared arrangement between the state and local school districts 
where the state provides funding to school districts in inverse relation to 
district property wealth.  State and local funds are distributed through a 
system of formulas known collectively as the Foundation School Program 
(FSP).  The FSP system consists of three tiers, the first two of which 
include a number of adjustments and weights designed to distribute 
funding according to the characteristics of the school district and its 
students while tier 3 provides support for facilities.  More specifically, tier 
1 is the base or foundation funding level which provides for individual 
allotments corresponding to program categories such as regular education, 
special education, compensatory education, bilingual education, career and 
technology education, gifted and talented education, the public education 
grant program, and transportation costs.  Tier 2 provides equalization 
funds to school districts beyond the base funding level in Tier 2 generating 
resources for education in the form of a guaranteed yield.  Tier 3 is 
another level of guaranteed yield program designed to provide funding 
specifically for facilities needs (p. 1-8). 
 
In summary, the present system of Texas public school finance is based upon a 
generally held belief that improved student achievement is a result, to some degree, of the 
amount of financial resources dedicated to that particular initiative (Picus, 1995).  As a 
result, a school funding structure has evolved which attempts to provide a high level of 




Review of School Finance Litigation 
The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, stated “powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved for the States…” Because education is not mentioned in the Federal 
Constitution it has historically been a legislative and judicial concern of the state 
(Thurston, 1990). 
Odden and Picus (1992) reviewed the key legal issues embedded in school 
finance litigation.  One important issue addressed in arguments involving school finance 
litigation questions how the school finance structures conflict with federal and state 
constitutions.  More specifically, do they conflict with either the Equal Protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and state constitution in which 
the school system originates?  This consideration revolved around two sub points. 
1) Was education a “fundamental right”? 
2) Did the circumstances involved create an argument for a “suspect class”? 
If either of these points were true, then this would necessitate the use of “strict judicial 
scrutiny” by the courts. 
Over several decades, a large body of litigation has challenged school finance 
systems in states across the nation.  The issues that are the subject of school finance 
litigation are often complex and far-reaching.  The courts have played an important role 
in reshaping educational policy as school finance and governance become more closely 
interrelated and as the movement toward nationwide and state educational standards gain 
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momentum (VanSlyke, 1994).  Cases may be separated into decisions based on state 
equality provisions and those based on state education clauses. 
State equality guaranty clauses are one means through which reformers have 
sought to challenge education financing in the states.  The use of the equality clause has 
met with limited success.  Plaintiffs have used a state equality provision as the basis for 
overturning school funding systems in five Supreme Court cases.  Four of the rulings are 
as follows: 
(a) Serrano v Priest II, in 1976, defined fundamental rights as “those individual 
rights and liberties that lie at the core of our free and representative form of 
government” (557 P.2d at 952).  The Court referred to many sources to 
establish the vital role of education, stating that education is as important as 
two other fundamental rights-the right to vote and the rights of criminal 
defendants (Banks, 1991, p. 143). 
(b) Pauley v. Bailey, in 1979, and Washakie v. Herschler, in 1980, used the same 
test to find that education was a fundamental right; both the West Virginia and 
Wyoming courts relied on the “explicitly or implicitly guaranteed” test of 
Rodriguez (Banks, p. 144). Cases that have attempted to establish education as 
a right that is explicitly guaranteed by the state constitution have met with 
little success. 
(c) Horton v. Meskill, in 1977, came to the conclusion that education was a 
fundamental right under the state constitution through an examination of “the 
degree of support given to education by the legislature throughout the state’s 
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history”(Thro, p. 1676).  Essentially, because the court found that the practice 
for centuries had been to act as if it was Connecticut is duty to provide 
education to its children the “duty had assumed the status of a constitutional 
obligation”(Banks, pp. 149-150). 
The fifth case did not address the issue of fundamentality.  In Dupree v. Alma, in 
1983, the court used a rational basis test to determine if the Arkansas government had a 
rational basis for financing the school system as it did.  The court found that the state 
system was irrational.  As one commentator noted, the Arkansas interpretation of the 
rational test has “more bite” than the federal rational basis test (Thro, p. 1671 n. 147). 
The equal protection clause was used effectively in some cases in the 1970s; 
another avenue for litigation was state education provision.  Arguments alleging that a 
state’s educational financing system violates the education clause in its constitution have 
become increasingly successful in overturning school funding systems.  Some of the 
cases where courts ruled school-funding systems unconstitutional based solely on the 
education clause include: 
(a) Robinson v. Cahill, in 1973, the court ordered school financing reform after 
determining that the state’s constitutional mandate for “thorough and 
efficient” education required an equal opportunity for all children, a mandate 
that the court felt was not being met because of funding disparities present in 
the existing system (Thro, p. 1656). 
(b) Abbot v. Burke, in 1985, the New Jersey court went beyond its decision in 
Robinson and decided that a “thorough and efficient” education requires an 
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educational system that provides disadvantaged students the opportunity to 
compete with their advantaged peers.  As a result, the existing school 
financing system was ruled unconstitutional, although only for the 28 poorest 
school districts in New Jersey [495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985).]  This decision was 
particularly important because it not only implied an equal spending criterion, 
but it also recognized that the needs of poor children will require the state to 
spend even more on these students than it does when educating other students 
(VanSlyke, 1994).  In a series of Abbott rulings, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court has ordered the state to address deficiencies in its 30 poorest districts. 
The orders spell out what must happen in those poor districts in order for the 
state to comply with its constitution. The court held that 1) the Commissioner 
of Education must designate schools as low or high performing; 2) low 
performing schools must undergo a review and planning process to make 
informed decisions about school and/or program improvement pursuant to 
agreement developed by a performance assessment team, a school 
management and improvement team, and the district; 3) the school 
management and improvement team may develop a plan for high performing 
schools in consultation with the district central office; and 4) a collaborative 
work group must be established to develop protocols and guidance for a 
program of whole school reform in Abbott district middle and high schools 
(Abbott v. Burke, N.J. June 24, 2003). 
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(c) Seattle School District No.1 v. State, in 1978, the Washington Supreme Court 
overturned its decision four years earlier in Kinnear, which had found the 
system of school financing constitutional (Thro, p. 1669).  The court 
reinterpreted the state’s education clause to impose a duty on the state. 
(d) Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., in 1989, the state supreme court 
considered “whether the Kentucky General Assembly has complied with its 
constitutional mandate to provide an efficient system of common schooling 
throughout the state (Rose, p. 189).  The court ignored the avenue of the equal 
protection provision and stated the issue as whether the present financing 
system was “efficient.”  In a decision unprecedented in the history of school 
finance reform, the court ultimately decided that Kentucky entire system of 
common schools was unconstitutional (Thro, p. 1664 n. 113). 
Review of School Finance Litigation in Texas 
A review of judicial level decisions reveals that five landmark decisions have 
profoundly shaped Texas’ school funding system.  These decisions are: 
(a) Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District, in 1973, successfully 
argued that the Texas system of public school finance discriminated against 
children living in property poor school districts, and denied equal protection 
for those same students (“An Introduction,” 1990); 
(b) Edgewood I, in 1989, successfully argued that funding for Texas school 




(c) Edgewood II (the determination of the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1 of 
1990) declared that the system was unconstitutional because it did not remedy 
the cause of opportunity gaps between rich and poor school districts (Whitney, 
1992); 
(d) Edgewood III (Carrollton-Farmers Branch I.S.D. v. Edgewood I.S.D.), in 
1992, determined that the 188 County Education Districts created by Senate 
Bill 351 were unconstitutional in that they represented a state ad valorem tax 
which is unconstitutional (Sparkman & Carpenter, 1994); and 
(e) Edgewood IV (the determination of the constitutionality of Senate Bill 7 of 
1993), found that the system of public school finance based on wealth 
reduction by property rich school districts was constitutional (Whitney & 
Crampton, 1995). 
(f) West Orange-Cove v. Alanis, in 2003, the plaintiff school districts argued in 
district court that they had been forced to tax at the maximum tax rate in order 
to educate students as required by Texas law and rule.  The district court 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit in July 2001 and the Third Court of Appeals 
affirmed the decision in April 2002.  The case was appealed to the Texas 
Supreme Court where the court reversed the lower court ruling and remanded 
the case to district court for a trial. Four districts, including West Orange-
Cove CISD, contended that the cap on operations tax rates represented an 
unconstitutional state property tax, originally brought this lawsuit in 2001. 
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However, the suit now seeks broad changes to the entire school financing 
structure (TASB, 2003). 
Successful school finance litigation poses significant challenges to educational 
policy.  The courts have often ruled that existing school finance systems are 
unconstitutional though a multiplicity of views exists on how states should facilitate 
broad concepts.  These concepts range from equal educational opportunity to revenue and 
resource allocations systems.  The courts and the legislatures must weigh conflicting 
research that have legal, political and economic factors in constructing new financing 
arrangements. 
Review of Fiscal Accountability Legislation in Texas 
Senate Bill 7 (1993) was enacted by the 73rd Legislature, effective for school 
years 1993-94 to present.  The primary focus of this bill was wealth equalization for all 
school districts at a level of $280,000 per weighted average daily attendance (WADA).  
Currently, school districts with wealth above the statutory threshold of $305,000 per 
WADA are affected. 
According to Texas Education Code, those school districts that exceeded this 
established wealth level (known as Chapter 41 districts) had five options from which to 
choose to accomplish this mandate: 
Option 1 - Consolidation by agreement.  The school boards of two or more 
districts may agree to consolidate in order to create a new district with wealth per 
pupil of less than the statutory wealth threshold. 
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Option 2 - Detachment and Annexation by Agreement.  The school boards of two 
or more districts may agree to detach property from one school district and attach 
it to one or more school districts.  The wealth of the district from which property 
was detached may not exceed the statutory wealth threshold per WADA.  The 
wealth of any district to which property was attached may not exceed the 
guaranteed yield level per WADA. 
Option 3 - Purchase of Attendance Credits.  A district with wealth per WADA 
above the statutory threshold may purchase attendance credits from the state.  One 
attendance credit is equal to one student in WADA.  In effect, the district sends a 
check to the state. 
Option 4 - Contract for Education of Nonresident Students. A district with wealth 
above the equalized level may enter into an agreement with a qualifying district to 
pay the cost of educating students in that district.  The paying district provides the 
receiving district with revenue per weighted pupil equal to the amount spent in the 
paying district.  Weighted pupils from the receiving district are added to the 
paying district’s student count.  Under this option, the state deducts the average 
entitlement from the receiving district, and any excess funds from the sending 
district entitlement from the receiving district, and any excess funds from the 
sending district are left for the receiving district. 
Option 5 - Tax base Consolidation.  The school boards of two or more districts 
may agree to conduct an election to create a consolidated taxing district for the 
maintenance and operations of the two school districts.  The resulting taxing 
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district may not have a property wealth per pupil above the equalized level  
(Texas School Law Bulletin, 2002). 
Each of the five options required local voter approval before implementation, 
thereby compensating for one of the major shortcomings found by the court with Senate 
Bill 351.  Senate Bill 7 was also reviewed by the legal system and was found 
constitutional on January 30, 1995. 
Senate Bill 7 also provided a hold harmless clause that allowed all districts 
classified as property wealthy to continue to raise the same amount of funds per weighted 
average attendance for three years (through 1995-96) as each district raised per weighted 
average attendance during the 1992-93 school year (“School Finance,” 1995). 
The equalization provision of Senate Bill 7 initially affected 99 of the 1,046 
districts that had taxable value in excess of $280,000 per weighted average daily 
attendance.  Each of the identified districts was required to hold an election during the 
fall of 1993 for voters to determine an option, or combination of options, which would 
reduce local wealth to the statutory limit.  One district elected to detach property to lower 
its wealth, fifty-two districts approved the purchase of weighted attendance credits, eight 
districts voted to educate non-resident students, and thirty-eight districts voted for a 
combination of purchasing weighted average daily attendance credits from the state and 
educating non-resident students (Sparkman, 1994).  The total reduction of value resulted 




TEA identified 118 districts subject to the wealth sharing provisions of Chapter 
41 for the 2002-03 school year.  In 2003-04, 134 districts serving over 500,000 students 
were subject to Chapter 41.  All of these districts chose either Option 3, the purchase of 
attendance credits, or Option 4, education of non-resident students.  Both Options 3 and 4 
recaptured revenue from high-wealth districts.  Some people refer to the provisions of 
Chapter 41 as the “Robin Hood” plan (TASB, 2003). 
Texas Performance Review 
The Texas School Performance Review (TSPR), directed by Texas State 
Comptroller Carole Keeton Strayhorn, was the nation's first and leading state-level 
program that was designed to improve the management and finances of individual public 
school districts. Since its inception in 1991, TSPR has conducted nearly 100 audits of 
public school districts and recommended net savings totaling three quarters of a billion 
dollars. This number is continually growing since the Comptroller and the Texas 
Legislature have directed TSPR to conduct 20 reviews each year. In each review, the 
TSPR team identifies a district's administrative, organizational and financial problems 
and recommends ways to cut costs, increase revenues, reduce overhead, streamline 
operations and improve the delivery of educational services. 
A TSPR review was a more than a traditional financial audit. TSPR examines a 
district's operations in a dozen vital areas, including:  (1) organization and management; 
(2) educational service delivery; (3) personnel management; (4) community involvement; 
(5) facilities use and management; (6) financial management; (7) asset and risk 
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management; (8) purchasing and warehousing functions; (9) computers and technology; 
(10) food services; (11) transportation and (12) safety and security. 
After the Comptroller chooses to conduct a review or accepts a district's 
invitation, TSPR begins interviews, holds town hall meetings and focus group sessions 
with community leaders, school organizations, parents, school administrators, teachers, 
district personnel and students to gauge community attitudes and expectations.  This 
method does utilize qualitative findings in comparison to TEA “numbers-based” school 
district financial accountability system (S.B. 875).  TSPR defines a financially poorly 
performing district as one with a lower than appropriate fund balance, a high property tax 
rate and low staff to student ratios in comparison to state averages in these areas 
(http://www.window.state.tx.us/tspr/tsprqa.html/, 2003). 
Senate Bill 218 (2001) 
The 77th Legislature conceptualized financial accountability of public schools in 
Texas through the cosponsoring by Senator Florence Shapiro (R-Plano) and 
Representative Wayne Smith (R-Baytown) of Senate Bill (SB) 218.  This piece of 
legislation included the following: 
(a.) Requires the commissioner of education and the comptroller of public 
accounts to develop and implement a financial accountability system for 
school districts. 
(b.) Requires school districts to complete the financial management report and 
hold hearings for public comment (Senate Research Center, 2001, p. 90). 
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The historical precedent of this legislation was Senate Bill 875, 76th Texas 
Legislature, 1999, which added TEC, §39.201, requiring the commissioner of education 
in consultation with the comptroller of public accounts to develop proposals for a school 
district financial accountability rating system that was to be presented to the legislature 
no later than December 15, 2000.  TEC, §39.201, expired September 1, 2001.  
Subsequently, SB 218, 77th Texas Legislature, 2001, added TEC, §§39.201-39.204, 
requiring the commissioner to adopt rules for the implementation and administration of 
the financial accountability rating system prescribed by TEC, Chapter 39, Subchapter I 
(Commissioner Rules). 
The adopted new 19 TAC Chapter 109, Budgeting, Accounting, and Auditing, 
Subchapter AA, Commissioner's Rules Concerning Financial Accountability Rating 
System, includes provisions that detail the purpose, ratings, types of ratings, criteria, 
reporting, and sanctions for the financial accountability rating system, in accordance with 
SB 218, 77th Texas Legislature, 2001.  The adopted rules include the financial 
accountability rating form entitled "School FIRST – Rating Worksheet" that explains the 
indicators that the Texas Education Agency will analyze to assign school district financial 
accountability ratings (Appendix A).   This form specifies the minimum financial 
accountability rating information that a district is to report to parents and taxpayers in the 
district.  The rating system indicators are organized into the following areas: 
• Critical Indicators (#1-5) 
• Fiscal Responsibility (#6-10) 
• Budgeting (#11-14) 
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• Personnel (#15-17) 
• Cash Management (#18-21) 
The fiscal impact was designed to be to school districts that failed the financial 
rating system and possibly have their accreditation lowered.  The amount of fiscal impact 
would depend on how the information was used by each school district's constituents. 
School districts would have to prepare an annual financial management report and have a 
public meeting on the report.  Senate Bill (SB) 218 of the 77th Legislature (2001) required 
the implementation of a transitional financial accountability rating system for school 
districts by August 2002. 
Texas Education Agency Fiscal Tools 
Financial Accountability has been a focus area due to legislation and 
commissioner rulings.  These include the following fiscal tools: 
The Financial Excellence Indicator System for Texas –Information about 
Educational Resources (FEISTIER) was launched through a partnership between Texas 
Association of School Business Officials (TASBO) and the Texas Education Agency 
(TEA) in 2000.  FEISTIER provides five years of comprehensive audited financial data 
along with other related data needed for comparing and monitoring changes in financial 
and academic performance.  This database is updated annually, and the functionality, 
analysis, and reporting components are reviewed and improved each year using feedback 
from users (http://www.tbec.org/feistier.htm, 2003). 
The Financial Recovery Initiative for Texas public schools represented a 
concerted effort by the Texas Education Agency to identify the increasing number of 
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public and charter schools that are experiencing financial management difficulties.  Also, 
it was intended to promote certain strategies to help those districts overcome their 
respective difficulties. Categories of FRI include the following:  (1) Total staffing; (2) 
Total students; (3) Management and operating tax rate; and (4) Fund balance 
(http://www.esc13.net/finance/, 2003). 
The Financial Integrity Rating System of Texas (FIRST) expanded the public 
education accountability system in Texas as a mandate in S.B. 218 (2001).  It began as 
S.B. 875 during the 76th Legislative Session.  Both TEA and the Comptroller of Public 
Accounts consulted on the proposal and forwarded the idea to the Legislature in 
December 2000.  It is comprised of indicators at the district level similar to the current 
academic performance rating system (Appendix A).  This rating system was an attempt to 
furnish fair and equitable evaluators of the quality of financial management decisions. 
The primary objective of FIRST is to achieve quality performance in the 
management of school districts’ financial resources.  This goal is significant due to the 
complexity of accounting associated with the Texas school finance system and the 
current funding crisis in public education. 
School districts were classified into the following ratings under the FIRST model: 
Ratings No Indicators 
Superior 0-2 
Above Standard 3-4 
Standard 5-6 
Substandard More than 6 or “No” in critical 




Districts receiving either of the two latter ratings under this accountability system must 
file a corrective action plan with the Texas Education Agency. 
Some of the twenty-one indicators included in the FIRST initiative include the 
following:  (1) Declining enrollment; (2) Inappropriate staffing; (3) Changing Property 
Values; (4) Instruction spending percentages; (5) Internal controls; and (6) Fund balance 
percentages (http://www.esc17.net/escweb/, 2003). 
The FIRST goals include:  1) achieving improved performance in the 
management of school districts’ financial resources; 2) facilitating better uses of financial 
resources; and 3) demonstrating increased district financial performance.  While the 
FIRST objectives attempt to:  1) assess the quality of financial management; 2) publicly 
report the rating; 3) assure the maximum allocation possible for direct instructional 
purposes; 4) implement a rating system that fairly and equitably evaluates the quality of 
financial management decisions. 
The FIRST ratings began in the 2000 fiscal year.  There were 874 school districts, 
which were ‘superior’; 90 school districts above ‘standard’; 5 school districts ‘standard’; 
and 71 districts, which were ‘substandard’.  The potential consequence for a 
‘substandard’ achievement rating could result in assignment of a Financial Monitor or 
Master to control finance (http://www.esc17.net/escweb/download.01FIRST.ppt). 
Fiscal Tools and the Decision Making Models 
The formulation of the fiscal tools of the Texas Education Agency are grounded 
in the rational decision making model.  They utilize orderly and substantive decision- 
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making processes.  Their focus is centered on efficiency and effectiveness.  They 
optimize rules and standards. 
In constrast, incrementalism employs a procedural process centered on the 
traditional methodologies characterized by stability and fairness.  Finally, the garbage can 
model reflects inconsistent and pluralistic dimensions characterized by potential 
disagreements.  Their use of data is haphazard and segmented. 
The Concept of Bankruptcy and Distress 
For the purposes of this study, the term bankruptcy refers to the ability of a local 
governmental entity, such as a school district, to file for bankruptcy under the provisions 
of Chapter 9 of the Uniform Bankruptcy Act.  Only 14 states permit filing Chapter 9 
bankruptcy.  They include:  Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Louisiana, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina and Texas. 
The purpose of the original Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as well as the present code, 
is to allow a bankrupt debtor to discharge his debts and to provide for an equitable and 
timely distribution of the remaining assets to the creditors. 
According to Wood (1985), there are three major impediments to the widespread 
use of Chapter 9 by school districts: 
(1) State law must authorize the filing of a Chapter 9 provision. 
(2) The municipality or school district must be insolvent at the time of filing. 
(3) The filing of a Chapter 9 provision makes any further public debt financing by 
the entity almost impossible. 
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Most generally accepted descriptors of fiscal distress that are available find their basis 
from the private as well as the public domain.  The most recognized meaning associated 
with fiscal distress encompasses the execution of bankruptcy proceedings and the ensuing 
closing.  Often, this phenomenon is most closely associated with events in the corporate 
world.  Yet, it has not been uncommon to use it with events in the context of public 
schooling. 
Murphy (1983), Berny (1982), and Lee (1983) defined fiscally distressed schools 
as districts which either closed, received emergency loans, or requested pre-closing 
audits.  Miller (1994) cautioned that school finance is not a simple thing.  District 
officials should begin to understand and recognize the manifestations of a financially ill 
school district.  Symptoms incuded: 
(1) The district spends more than its income. 
(2) The district saves money by having a cheap annual audit. 
(3) The district overstates income and growth calculations. 
(4) The district is more than one year behind on accounts payable items. 
(5) The district does very few budget revisions. 
(6) The district has no control system for payroll expenditures. 
(7) The district has excessive multiyear union contracts with built in automatic 
increments. 
(8) The district continues to level up when the economy is leveling down. 
(9) The district practices expensive and unrealistic personnel practices. 
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(10) The district does not monitor building projects, related income, and cash-
flow sources. 
(11) The district under staffs the business office to save money. 
(12) The district fills an open certified business officer position with an extra 
principal to save money. 
(13) The district approves program endorsed by the superintendent and others 
because the programs are good for the students, despite excessive 
encroachment on the general fund (Miller, 1994). 
Groves and Godsey (1980), Popernick (1987) in their works established the 
current or general fund balances as a valid indicator of a governmental unit’s financial 
condition.  These studies focused on fiscal crises in municipalities, given the similarity of 
the accounting formats for both municipal governments and school districts, changes in a 
district’s fund balances might be a suitable definition to study school district financial 
distress. 
Miller and McClure (1988) provided seven tools for reliable budget forecasts and 
seven ways to survive the forecast.  The authors stated that to furnish reliable budget 
forecasts, it is important to do the following:  (a) clarify the purpose of the forecast, (b) 
match the time frame of the forecast with the purpose, (c) be certain that basic data is 
correct, (d) specify any assumptions, (e) be consistent in calculations, (f) examine the 
data critically, and (g) recognize that forecasting requires insight and intuition.   
The authors also stated that to survive the budget forecasts, it is important to do 
the following:  (a) compare apples to apples, (2) identify the competitors for school 
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district resources, (c) obtain accurate enrollment data and teacher population trends, (d) 
identify trends in the local economy and local business climate, (e) clarify data on 
assessed value and markets, (f) understand current trends in the housing market, and (g) 
monitoring the collection structure to identify obsolete practices. 
Swanson (1978) contended that school districts are accused of inefficiency but are 
not equipped to dispute the charge through analysis.  The author argued that the school 
board should provide for this analysis by hiring an efficiency analyst who could 
rationally evaluate all of the alternatives and force the individuals competing for 
resources to do the same.  This would identify differences in priorities among the 
activists.  The efficiency analyst could then present the results to the board of education 
to make the final decision after assessing the various positions. 
Walters (1997) claimed that school business administrators probably do not use 
financial ratios unless they have a background in accounting and, even then, probably do 
not use them in presentations to the school board or community.  Walters presented the 
following five ratios, which he called stability ratios, which could be used to analyze 
school districts fiscal health. 
(1) Fund Balance 
Total Assets 
 
(2) Net Revenue 
Fund Balance 
(3) Fixed Assets 
Long Term Debt 
(4) Current Receivables X 365 days 
 Annual Revenue 
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(5) Payables    X 365 days 
 Expenditures 
 
The ratio of fund balance to total assets can be computed for the general fund or 
any of the individual funds.  This ratio shows what part of total assets is free and clear.  
The ratio of net revenue to fund balance indicates how current operations are affecting 
the fund balance.  Net revenue is calculated by subtracting total expenditures from total 
revenues.  The ratio of fixed assets to long-term debt reveals district ownership of 
physical facilities in contrast to that owned by bondholders or outside agencies.  This 
ratio is less important in school finance.  It is not likely that a school district would sell 
buildings to pay debts.  The ratio of current receivables to annual revenues multiplied by 
365 days is the receivable turnover rate, and it is desirable to have a very small number.  
This measures the rate at which receivables are collected.  The ratio of payables to 
expenditures multiplied by 365 days is the payable turnover rate, and it is desirable to 
have a large number.  This measures how long the entity has control over cash. 
The Stability of Publicly Funded Institutions 
The historical trends surrounding insolvency and bankruptcy speak to the debts of 
merchants and individuals.  The complexity of modern society and the response of 
governments to those conditions appear to have created another category of debtors.  The 
new category is that of government itself.  The necessity of restructuring while 
continuing the functions of government becomes overriding.  The principle that publicly 
funded institutions cannot become bankrupt because of the ability to generate taxes has 
been proven untrue.  The failures of both municipalities and school systems are indication 
of a changing world.  The failures also force the need for innovative economic thinking to 
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find alternatives when governmental failures seem overwhelming.  All organizations are 
exposed to the conditions of scarcity. 
Predicting Fiscal Distress in the Corporate World 
The ability of Texas educational leaders to detect school district distress is vital 
for fiscal and political well being in education.  Corporate economics gives evidence that 
there exist techniques that would be helpful in predicting fiscal distress in school districts.  
Honsberger (1979) asserted that bankruptcy and fiscal distress do no occur overnight in 
the corporate world.  There are numerous indicators or predictors of fiscal problems that 
are available.  Horrigan (1965), Beaver (1966, 1968), Deakin (1972) and Edmister (1972) 
all conducted research that reinforced this contention by demonstrating how particular 
financial ratios and computations were accurate as predictors of financial difficulties in 
the private sector. 
Beaver (1966) also examined financial ratios in the corporate world to predict 
failure relative to random prediction.  He utilized thirty different ratios and classified 
them into six groupings.  These included:  cash flow, net income, debt to assets, liquid 
assets to total debt, liquid asset to current debt, and turnover ratio.  His conclusions 
centered around the belief that cash flow to total debt ratio had the ability to correctly 
classify failed firms significantly better than random prediction.  Beaver (1968) followed 
up with a second study in which he compared various liquid versus non-liquid asset 
ratios.  He concluded that in this study non-liquid asset ratios predicted corporate failure 
significantly better than liquid asset measures.  He also noted failed firms have lower 
inventory balances than non-failed firms. 
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Beaver’s studies were replicated by Deakin (1972) using thirty-two failed 
companies matched to thirty-two non-failed companies of similar size and industrial 
classification.  The researcher had to distinguish between the groups by selecting a 
collection of discriminating variables that measure characteristics on which the groups 
are expected to differ.  Deakin used Beaver’s ratios as his discriminating variables. 
Edmister (1972) also concluded that the application of a discriminate function 
analysis (DFA) used previously could lead to highly accurate predictions of small 
business failure with up to three years lead time.  This researcher used nineteen common 
accounting ratios and five prevailing methods of analysis in studing a random sample of 
forty-two statements submitted to the Small Business Administration over a fifteen year 
period.  His goal was to develop a function that would predict between loss and non-loss 
borrowers. 
Predicting Fiscal Distress in the Educational World 
In his review of the literature, Wade (1987) noted that although discriminate 
function analysis had been proven accurate in predicting corporate failure, this tool had 
rarely been used by public entities, particularly K-12.  One exception cited was the 
research done by Lee (1983) in which DFA was used in a study of 615 school districts in 
Ohio.  He found three variables covering the categories of liquidity, commitments, and 
investment earnings to be discriminant.  Lee developed a model from these three 




Wade (1987) examined 24 pairs of Michigan school districts of similar 
characteristics matching school districts with deficits with school districts that were 
fiscally sound.  He developed a model employing DFA, which was 100% accurate in 
predicting the deficit and non-deficit school districts within the sample population.  
Pertinent conclusions drawn from Wade’s study included:  (1) ratio analysis can predict 
fiscal distress two or more years in advance; (2) per pupil expenditures improve 
predictive formula’s powers; and (3) district employment costs including wages and 
benefits significantly improve the power of the analysis. 
The implementation of compliance with state mandated standards of accounting 
furnished the county offices with expanded authority over development and monitoring 
of school district budgets (Frazier, 1993).  The process is still evolving.  Frazier (1993) 
noted several weaknesses.  These included:  (1) the need for compatibility between 
district and state accounting and budgetary systems; (2) the failure to develop a 
“statistical trail”; and (3) the recognition that current indicators might not be timely 
predictors. 
Peek (1994) studied financial statements from 86 school districts in the Capital 
Region of Northern California over a two-year period.  She compared fifteen ratios for 20 
school districts that had been identified by the state as financially troubled with 20 similar 
school districts in the Capital Region who had been determined by the researcher to be in 
a financially strong position. 
Finkelstein (1994) investigated the spending patterns of 1,000 California School 
Districts during a four-year period.  In regards to capital and debt-related expenses he 
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found significantly higher expenditures for long-term loan repayment for high school and 
elementary school districts in the distressed groupings.  Finkelstein concluded that 
although cash reserves and district types are general indicators of fiscal distress, a 
consistent spending pattern could not be identified.   
The inference that was made asserted that financial difficulties are a combination 
of interactions that go well beyond the amount of money spent in a particular year for 
goods and services in certain budget categories.  The researcher must go beyond 
understanding the fiscal condition of a school district to a better understanding of 
management practices and the decision-making process to be successful in differentiating 
more and less financially stable school districts. 
The possibility of using financial ratios as a tool for analyzing and predicting 
insolvency in California school districts was studied by Saul (1995).   She compared a 
group of 39 school districts that had experienced bankruptcy and/or were assigned a 
negative or qualified certification with two control groups during a two-year period.  
Twenty-four financial ratios were created that paralleled ratios that have been used in 
private industry and/or public institutions.  Each of these ratios was devised so that they 
could use data available in the California Financial Reports filed annually by all school 
districts with their County Office of Education.  To predict group membership a school 
district was first evaluated using Saul’s Discriminate Function.  A district would be 
predicted to be in the Distressed or Not Distressed category depending on if its score was 
closer to either the insolvent group mean or the solvent group mean. 
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Manca (1997) conducted a qualitative study on three distinctive school districts 
that had been in receivership.  The researcher sought to find those conditions, fiscal 
decisions, and changes in law that had helped the school districts regain fiscal solvency.  
The commonalities noted by the researcher were as follows:  (1) financial problems were 
incremental; (2) some form of short-term debt was used to supplement cash flow; and (3) 
a receiver was appointed by the state to take over the administration of the district; (4) 
there was a lack of long-range financial planning; and (5) the superintendents did not 
demonstrate a clear understanding of the financial position of the districts. 
Summary 
This review of literature sought to furnish a conceptual foundation that would 
justify the purposes of this study.  In summarizing the review of literature for this chapter 
it is evident that there have been numerous quantitative studies conducted on fiscal 
distress and the application of ratio analysis.  Also, the historical background of Texas 
has been filled with both judicial and legislative decisions that have addressed political, 
legal and economic questions in terms of financial accountability. 
Public schools continue to struggle with the problem of balancing ever-growing 
needs with limited sources of revenue.  A question can be raised whether is this a 
dilemma due to forces outside of the educational realm, or is it due to poor management 
of district resources? 
The financial accountability rating system instituted in Texas was designed to 
benefit the public by putting into place a system to ensure that school districts would be 
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held accountable for the quality of their financial management practices and achieve 















































The purpose of this study is to understand the financial conditions and decision 
making protocols in two school districts which have been identified by a panel of experts 
as well as the Texas Education Agency data bases as having ‘substandard’ ratings, and as 
having recovered or are in the process of significant recovery from fiscal insolvency. 
The following research questions were addressed: 
(1) What were the factors contributing to the districts’ fiscal insolvency? 
(2) What were the factors contributing to the districts’ regaining fiscal solvency? 
(3) Were the fiscal tools of the Texas Education Agency used in resolving the 
problem?  
A qualitative case study approach will be used for this study.  School finance is a 
very complex issue and any attempt to describe and understand the circumstances prior to 
the fiscal dilemmas of a given school district would demand an investigation using 
qualitative research methods. In that the school districts have made considerable progress 
toward regaining fiscal solvency this study could furnish baseline information and 
recommendations for other school districts having fiscal problems. 
The design of this study was to utilize a multiple case study based on (a) the 
application of descriptive quantitative financial ratios for each case, (b) PEIMS data, (c) 
on-site semi structured interviews, and (d) a review of primary financial documents.  The 
procedures that the researcher used to conduct the study were:  (a) the selection of cases, 
(b) development of interview methodology, (c) field testing of interview questions, (d) 
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content analysis of documents, (e) data analysis, (f) assessment of validity and reliability, 
and (g) a summary.  Multiple cases were chosen for several reasons.  One of those 
reasons was to establish trustworthiness.  The researcher was able to establish the 
strength of the emerging themes by discovering instances where common experiences 
occurred from one case to another. Miles and Huberman (1994) stated that even “stiffer 
cases can be made by looking at multiple cases: finding a pattern in a cross-case display, 
and then tracing carefully through all the cases to see whether the pattern is repeated”(p. 
273). 
Conceptual Framework 
Budgeting requires decision-making.  The task in rational choice theory is to 
identify or discover the optimal choice for the outcome of decision, confronting a 
decision-maker.  The decision maker simply collects information on the levels of the 
attributes of the alternatives, applies pre-existing values to those levels, applies the 
appropriate choice rule, and the superior option is revealed. A virtue of the theoretical 
framework of rational choice is that this paradigm identifies attention to the difference 
between the goals of the individual in terms of maximizing their own welfare and the 
professed goals of the organization.  This theory furnishes a rational explanation for 
much of the behavior that otherwise appears irrational or pathological in terms of the 
expected outcomes of the decision. 
There are a variety of decision-making modes.  Both procedural uncertainty and 
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The rationalist Simon (1977) model for decision process is probably the most well 
known.  It describes three main phases in the decision-making process:  1) Intelligence; 
2) Design; and 3) Choice 
These phases are summarized as a set of steps as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1:  Steps in the phases of Simon’s Decision Process Cycle 
Simon Phase Steps to Follow 
Intelligence (problem finding) • Gathering of data 
• Identifying objectives 
• Diagnosing problems 
• Validating data 
Design (develop alternatives) • Manipulate data 
• Quantify objectives 
• Generate reports 
• Generate alternatives 
• Assign risks or values to 
alternatives 
Choice (evaluate and select alternatives) • Generate statistics on alternatives 
• Explain alternatives 
• Choose among alternatives 
• Explain choice 
Source:  Keen, P.G.W., & Morton, M.S., (1978). Decision Support Systems: an 
organizational perspective. Addison-Wesley. 
 
Rational decision-making can be viewed through the following model (Figure 2). 
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 The researcher believed that leadership in each school district would utilize the 
rational decision-making expressed in Figure 2 and Table 1.  The theoretical framework 
furnished a backdrop to display the decision-making processes explored in this research 
study.  
Methodologies 
 In order to answer the questions that have been proposed the following mixed 
methodologies seem appropriate pragmatically and intuitively.  Quantitative ratios and 
percentage changes were calculated to ensure the validity of the school districts’ recovery 
and to present a rational approach to recovery recognition.  Qualitative research was used 
to investigate the school districts through a more individual viewpoint.   Interviews were 
held with the leading stakeholders in each district in order to gain perspectives of the 
participants.   
The Use of Qualitative Research 
Qualitative research is multifaceted, involving an interpretive, naturalistic 
approach to its subject matter (Mertens, 1998).  Qualitative research involves the use and 
collection of a variety of empirical methods – case study, personal experience, 
introspective, life story, interview, observational, historical, interactional, and visual texts 
– that describe routine and problematic moments and meanings in individuals’ lives 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 2). 





(c) documents and artifacts. 
In the 1970s, qualitative approaches, including case studies of the social life of 
schools and their participants began to appear (Merriam, 1995).  Qualitative research can 
provide researchers with data for diagnosing and designing strategies to focus on 
organizational difficulties.  The information generated can enable decision makers to 
design strategies for avoiding potential problems before they become serious difficulties 
(Herndon & Kreps, 1993). 
The following characteristics of qualitative research methodology were identified 
by Taylor and Bogdan (1984). 
(1) Qualitative research is inductive. 
(2) The researcher looks at people and settings holistically. 
(3) Qualitative researchers are sensitive to their effects on the people they study. 
(4) Qualitative researchers try to understand people from their own frame of 
reference. 
(5) The qualitative researcher sets aside his or her beliefs, perspectives, and 
predispositions, 
(6) All perspectives are valuable for the qualitative researcher. 
(7) Qualitative methods are humanistic. 
(8) Qualitative researchers emphasize validity in their research. 
(9) For the qualitative researcher, all settings and people are worthy of study. 
One of the most significant types of qualitative research can be found in case 
study research. Case study research is a description and analysis of an experience. The 
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object in a case study is to arrive at a holistic account and understanding.  Some authors 
view the case study as one type of ethnographic (interpretive) research that involves 
intensive and detailed study of one individual or of a group as an entity, through 
observation, self-reports, and any other means (Langenbach, Vaughn, & Aagaard, 1994). 
The case study method has been used across a variety of disciplines including 
law, medicine, psychology, sociology, and education.  One of the characteristics of the 
case study approach is its adaptability to different research problems in many fields of 
study (Merriam & Simpson, 1995). Case study research uses many of the same 
techniques as historical research but it has two additional sources of evidence:  direct 
observation and systematic interviewing. 
There are four essential properties of a qualitative case study that were set forth 
by Merriam and Simpson (1995).  Case studies are: 
(1) Particularistic.  Case studies focus on a particular situation, event, program, 
and/or phenomenon. 
(2) Descriptive.  The end product of a case study is a rich description of the 
phenomenon under study. 
(3) Heuristic.  Case studies illuminate the reader’s understanding of the 
phenomenon under study.  They can bring about the discovery of new 
meaning, extend the reader’s experience, or confirm what is known. 
(4) Inductive.  Qualitative case studies for the most part rely upon inductive 




Selection of Cases 
Conducting case studies requires certain data collection protocols.  For instance to 
study a case, Stake (1994) recommends data collection of the following types of 
information: 
(1) The nature of the case 
(2) Its historical background 
(3) Other contexts, such as economic, political, legal, and aesthetic 
(4) Other cases through which this case is recognized 
(5) Those informants through whom the case can be known. 
The cases selected for study also emerged from discussions with individuals 
knowledgeable in school finance. The researcher contacted Tom Canby (personal 
communication, June 18, 2003) of the Texas Education Agency Financial Audits, and 
Rita Chase (personal communication, June 26, 2003) of Texas Education Agency 
Accountability Division for suggestions of districts in Texas that had been classified as 
‘substandard’ and have emerged or have made substantial progress toward fiscal 
improvement.  Other documented communications with experts included Omar Garcia 
(Region XIII School Finance Specialist), Gwen Santiago (Executive Director of the 
Texas Association of School Business Officials), Catherine Clark (Texas Association of 
School Board Accountability Division and University of Texas at Austin finance 
professor), Jess Butler (former Eanes I.S.D. superintendent) and Ed Flathouse (former 




The researcher’s committee suggested the model size of school district ranging 
from 3,000 to 8,000 students.  Thus, my selection was narrowed and a request letter was 
mailed (Appendix B) to the following school districts’ superintendents: Calhoun County 
ISD; Uvalde CISD; Lancaster ISD; Cedar Hill ISD; Zapata County ISD. 
Cedar Hill ISD and Uvalde CISD were chosen because they met the criteria of:  
1) the financial ratios; 2) the interest expressed by their respective superintendents; 3) 
improvement in TEA ‘substandard’ ratings in 2000-01; and 4) conversations and advice 
from various experts on school finance at the state and university faculty whom are 
familiar with Texas educational finance issues. 
Interview Methodology 
Protocol.  In-depth interviews provided the format for data collection for this 
study of school districts that have successfully emerged from fiscal instability or have 
made substantial progress toward regaining fiscal solvency.  Interviews were conducted 
in person at each of the school district sites:  Cedar Hill, Texas and Uvalde, Texas.  The 
participants interviewed for each case included the current school business official in 
each district; the current superintendent; and a representative of the Texas Education 
Agency overseeing the site. 
The persons interviewed were contacted by phone to make arrangements for 
interview times and dates.  Careful notes were taken at each interview and summaries of 
the notes were typed immediately.  Also, each interview was tape-recorded with 
participant consent. Confidentiality was maintained by not naming the respondents in the 
study and the destruction of the audiotapes. 
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The questions asked in the interviews emerged from a review of the literature.  
They were designed to collect data from individuals who have special knowledge or 
perceptions that would not otherwise be available to the researcher.  The first three 
questions were designed to establish that the person interviewed was a key informant and 
was qualified to speak to the problem.  Questions 4 through 10 sought to gain information 
about the research questions.  Interviews were semi-structured in nature in that the 
researcher asked structured questions and then probed more deeply using open-forum 
questions to obtain additional information.  This process allowed the respondent to 
propose his/her own insights into the fiscal crisis and its resolution.  In addition, sources 
of collaborative evidence or sources of information on prior history could emerge.  The 
following structured interview questions were used: 
(1) What is your current position with the school district/state office and how long 
have you been in this position? 
(2) What are the major duties relative to fiscal decisions or financial oversight in 
your current job? 
(3) What changes, if any, have been made in your duties since you first took the 
position? 
(4) When did you first learn of the fiscal problems in the school district?  What 
were the first indications of impending financial difficulties? 
(5) What were the circumstances immediately prior to a declaration of fiscal 
insolvency?  In considering both revenue and expenditures for the school 
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district, was one side of the ledger more of a factor leading to the financial 
crisis? 
(6) Was error in predicting revenue or enrollment a contributing factor? 
(7) Did administrative decisions other than financial decisions negatively impact 
the financial condition of the district?  Examples of such decisions might be 
curricular changes, staffing decisions, class size, or multi-year employee 
contracts. 
(8) What were the ramifications on the school district after the ‘substandard’ 
rating announcement?  (learning environment/staff morale/public perception) 
(9) In your opinion, what were the key factors, which contributed to regaining 
fiscal solvency?  (Possible factors could include changes in accounting 
procedures, additional staff in the business office, reduction in force, 
elimination of programs, multi-year budget planning, state mandated changes, 
better revenue forecasting) [Questions adapted from Manca, 1997] 
Potential Probing Question:  How were the Texas Education Agency fiscal tools 
(FEISTIER, FRI, and FIRST) used in resolving the problem? 
Field Testing of Interview Questions 
Trial interviews were conducted prior to the case study interviews in order to 
determine the appropriateness of the questions asked and to give the interviewer practice 
using the questioning strategies.  The trial interviews were conducted in person with 
school business officials from districts not involved in the study, with a representative 
from the Texas Education Agency, and with a former superintendent of a large school 
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district in Central Texas.  Slight modifications were made prior to conducting the actual 
interviews regarding the appropriateness of the questions to the study. 
Content Analysis of Documents 
The documents that the researcher obtained:  (a) PEIMS data, (b) public records 
(school board minutes), (c) budget records and/or audit reports for each district, (d) 
financial reports to the Texas Education Agency or the Texas Comptroller of Public 
Accounts (e) organizational chart of each district, (f) job description of the school 
business official, (g) newspaper and journal articles, and (h) applicable state laws or 
commissioner rulings. 
Treatment and Data Analysis 
Interview data was compared with information from primary documents such as 
annual financial reports, audit reports, and reports to the Texas Education Agency, and 
financial reports made to the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts Office.  The content 
analysis of interview data was compared with an analysis of the primary documents 
including budget records, audit reports, minutes, agendas and PEIMS data.  
Inconsistencies and conflicts with interview information were noted and reported. 
Data concerning the circumstances prior to a declaration of fiscal insolvency and 
during the period of ‘substandard’ rating was organized chronologically and presented in 
a descriptive format.  The researcher analyzed factors mentioned as contributing to 
regaining a higher rating in an effort to identify those factors that may be shared by the 
districts studied.  In addition, the contribution made by the Texas Education Agency 
fiscal tools toward resolving the problem was analyzed.  Each case was presented and 
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discussed in a section of Chapter Four.  Also, there is a section in Chapter Five covering 
cross-case analyses and summary resulting from all three sources of evidence. 
Validity and Reliability 
 A quantitative analysis was performed by the researcher through the 
application of four financial ratios to each district to support the reliability of the study.  
These financial ratios were developed by Saul (1996) in a study of 196 California school 
districts where she sought to identify the districts with possible financial adversity.  
Stepwise discriminate analysis from the four years of the study narrowed her original 24 
ratios to 8.  These were found to be significant in predicting the districts into solvent and 
insolvent groups.  The function to predict the insolvent group was Wilks’ Lambda of 
.833.  Ratios 3, 13, 17, 22 were found to be the most appropriate components of the 
discriminate function.  A more descriptive outline of each ratio is as follows: 
R-3 – Reserve for Economic Uncertainties to Total Expenditures (including 
transfers out and other uses. 
R-13 – Property tax as a percentage of total General Fund revenue. 
R-17- Cash to current liabilities. 
R-22- Benefits to total expenditures.  
The School District Ratios were organized as follows: 







R-3 School District Budgets    Increase 
R-13 FIESTIER    Increase 
R-17 Financial Audit    Increase 




Additionally, case study research must meet four design tests including (a) 
construct validity; (b) internal validity; (c) external validity; and (d) reliability. 
Yin (1994) has suggested various devices to meet each of these tests.  Construct 
validity is the most problematic test in case study research.  Using various sources of data 
and establishing a chain of evidence can help to guard against the allegation of 
subjectivity in data collection.  Also, having key informants review a draft of the case 
study report for accuracy can help to avoid disapproval.  In this study the researcher used 
several sources of evidence.  These included structured interviews, audit reports, balance 
sheets for each district, financial reports to the state, school board minutes, and relevant 
local newspaper articles to establish a chain of evidence.  Those persons interviewed for 
each case were furnished an opportunity to review a draft of the case study report. 
External validity or the ability to generalize from the findings of the study has 
been a major criticism of case study research. Yin (1994) suggests the use of a multi-case 
research design in order to avoid this limitation.  In this study, two totally independent 
cases have been selected for inclusion in a multi-case design to suggest a reasonable level 
of confidence that the findings can be generalized. 
The use of a case study protocol and the development of a database for the case 
study are suggested by Yin (1994) to make certain that the researcher is in fact measuring 
the intended variables.  Hence, the interview protocol for this multi-case study is 
presented above and is further enriched by the content analysis of primary documents for 




Case studies were reported in separate sections of Chapter Four for Cedar Hill 
Independent School District and Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District.  
Cross-case analyses, conclusions, implications, and recommendations are reported in 
Chapter Five. 
Summary 
The researcher has discussed the type of study and the kind of data that would be 
required to answer the research questions.  There was discussion of the data collection 



































Chapter Four consists of three major sections.  Each section presents the findings 
from a review of audit reports, budget documents, and financial reports, relevant 
newspaper articles, board minutes, correspondence, semi structured interviews with key 
informants, PEIMS data and financial ratios for each of the cases selected for inclusion in 
the study. The first section reports and analyzes the findings for the Cedar Hill 
Independent School District in Cedar Hill, Texas.  Included in this section are: (a) 
descriptive financial ratios; (b) background information; (c) district mission statement; 
(d) historical summary; (e) expenditures; (f) organization plan; (g) on-site interviews 
including key factors for regaining fiscal solvency; and (h) summary. 
The second section presents the findings for the Uvalde Consolidated Independent 
School District in Uvalde, Texas.  Included in this section are: (a) descriptive financial 
ratios; (b) background information; (c) district mission statement; (d) historical summary; 
(e) expenditures; (f) organization plan; (g) on-site interviews including key factors to 
regaining fiscal solvency; and (h) summary. 
Cedar Hill Independent School District 
Financial Ratios 
The researcher applied four financial ratios to the Cedar Hill ISD for FY 2000-01 
to FY 2002-03 to support the question that the district has made progress toward 
achieving fiscal solvency.   Saul (1996) developed the financial ratios in a study of 196 
California school districts where she sought to identify the districts with possible 
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financial adversity.  Stepwise discriminate analysis from the four years of the study 
narrowed her original 24 ratios to 8 that were found to be significant in predicting the 
districts into solvent and insolvent groups.  Ratios 17, 22, 13, and 3 were found to be the 
most appropriate components of the discriminate function. The ratios used were R-3, 
Reserve for Economic Uncertainties.  An increase in the ratios of Reserves for Economic 
Uncertainties to Total Expenditures would predict that the district would fall into a 
solvent group.  The researcher substituted the Ending Fund Balance in the General Fund 
for the Reserve for Economic Uncertainties since the Ending Fund Balance in Texas is a 
school district’s reserve for the subsequent year or years.  When compared to the Total 
Expenditures will measure the ability of a district to handle fiscal emergencies.  The Fund 
Balance is considered to be important enough to be a leading indicator in the TEA School 
FIRST Worksheet.  The document states:  “Was Total Fund Balance Less Reserved Fund 
Balance Greater than Zero in the General Fund?” (School First Rating Worksheet, p.69).  
For base fiscal year 2000-01 the district’s ending fund balance were -$2,727,529, so the 
ratio ends up being -$2,727,529/$36,361,719 or 0 (From TEA FDA 05(S) report).  For 
the FY 2001-02 the district’s ending fund balance was -$1,061,422.  The ratio was 
-$1,061,422/$43,222,518 or 0.  For the FY 2002-03 the district’s ending fund balance 
rose to $881,077.  The ratio became $881,077/$48,815,809 or .0180.  According to Dr. 
Maureen Saul’s research on school districts in California, an increase in the Reserve for 
Economic Uncertainties would predict that a given school district is more solvent.  The 
ratio in this district has gradually increased. 
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The second ratio applied to the Cedar Hill ISD was R-13, Property Tax as a 
Percentage of Total General Fund Revenue.  An increase in this ratio would indicate 
placement of a school district into the more solvent group.  For the base fiscal year 2000-
01 is $18,380,708/$33,710,895 or .5452.  For the FY 2001-02, the ratio was 
$23,687,354/$$43,243,639 or .5477.  For the FY 2002-03, the ratio was 
$28,530,600/$48,017,369 or .5941.  The trend in the ratios appears to be increasing.  This 
overall increase according to Saul (1996) would also indicate placement of Cedar Hill 
ISD toward the solvent group. 
The third ratio applied to the Cedar Hill ISD was R-17, Cash to Current 
Liabilities.  For the base fiscal year 2000-01, the ratio was $12,049,091/6,192,785 or 
1.9456.  For the FY 2001-02, the ratio was $25,493,005/$9,214,620 or 2.7665.  For the 
FY 2002-03, the ratio was $13,541,302/$8,654,168 or 1.5647.  An increase in this ratio 
would indicate the placement of the Cedar Hill ISD toward the solvent group.  This 
particular ratio fluctuated up and down and would not indicate a positive trend for the 
school district. 
The fourth ratio that was applied to the school district was R-22, Benefits to Total 
Expenditures.  For the base fiscal year of 2000-01, the ratio of Benefits to Total 
Expenditures was $2,556,043/$36,361,719 or .070.  For FY 2001-02, the ratio became 
$3,193,264/$43,222,518 or .073.  For FY 2002-03, the ratio of Benefits to Total 
Expenditures was $3,732,007/$48,815,809 or .076.  For this particular ratio a decrease 
indicates placement in the solvent group.  For the last three years, the trend appears to be 
increasing, which would place the Cedar Hill ISD toward the insolvent group.  The 
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results of the application of the four financial ratios to the Cedar Hill ISD are provided in 
Table 2. 
Table 2.  Cedar Hill ISD Ratios 
 FY 2000-01 FY 2001-02 FY 2002-03 
R-3 0 0 0.018 
R-13 0.545 0.547 0.594 
R-17 1.945 2.766 1.564 
R-22 .070 .073 .076 
R-3 – Reserve for Economic Uncertainties to Total Expenditures 
R-13 – Property tax as a percentage of total General Fund revenue. 
R-17 – Cash to current liabilities. 
R-22 – Benefits to total expenditures. 
 
The trend of the first ratio, R-3 or Reserve for Economic Uncertainties, increased 
numerical from FY 2000-01 on.  This increasing trend is an indication of improved 
solvency.  The second ratio, R-13 or Property Tax as a Percentage of Total General Fund 
Revenue shows an overall increase.  This increasing trend would also indicate improved 
solvency.  The third ratio, R-17 or Cash to Current Liabilities fluctuated giving no 
definitive trend or clear indication of improved solvency.  The fourth ratio, R-22 or 
Benefits to Total Expenditures, would need to show a decreasing trend to indicate 
improved solvency.  The results of this ratio project the contrary. 
Background Information 
The Cedar Hill Independent School District is located in southwestern Dallas 
County.  It is classified by University Interscholastic League (UIL) as a 5A School, 
which means it has a student enrollment of 1,925 and up.  The district delivers 
educational services to 7,554 students from pre-kindergarten through grade 12.  It serves 
an area of 41.9 square miles with the majority of the school district in Dallas County.  It 
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is located approximately 18 miles southwest of Dallas, Texas.  This school district has 6 
elementary schools (PK-4), 3 Intermediate (5-6), 1 Middle School (7-8), and 1 High 
School (9-12). As of the 2003-04 School Year the district’s student ethnic diversity was 
55 percent African American, 25 percent White, 17 percent Hispanic, and 3 percent Other 
(Cedar Hill I.S.D., State of the School District brochure, November, 2003). 
Exhibit 4-1 details the enrollment and demographic characteristics of Cedar Hill 
ISD, its neighboring peer districts, Regional Education Service Center X (Region 10) and 
the state. 
Exhibit 4-1 
Student Enrollment and Demographics 


















CHISD 7,331 52 16 30 2 0.5 26 
De Soto 7,584 66 12 20 1 0.2 34 
Duncanville 10,930 43 29 25 3 0.2 46 
Grand Prairie 21,554 15 52 28 4 0.8 59 
Region 10 635,621 21 33 41 5 0.5 45 
State 4,239,911 14 43 40 3 0.3 52 
Source:  Texas Education Agency (TEA); Public Education Information 
Management System (PEIMS), 2003-04. 
Note:  Totals may not add to 100 due to rounding. 
 
CHISD has less business and more residential property value than the state, all but 
one peer district and regional averages (Exhibit 4-2).  The higher percentage of 
residential value for CHISD indicates that local residents carry most of the local property 
tax burden to fund school operations.  Land accounts for more than 7.2 percent of 
CHISD’s property value, a percent that is higher than any of its peers, regional and state 
 
 82 
averages.  The higher land value indicates the potential for continued property 
development growth in CHISD. 
Exhibit 4-2 
CHISD, Region 10, State and Peer District Property Values by Category 
as a Percentage of Total Property Value  
2002-03 
District % Business %Residential % Land % Oil and Gas % Other 
De Soto 14.4 81.1 3.3 0.0 1.1 
Cedar Hill 20.7 72.1 7.2 0.0 0.0 
Grand Prairie 34.4 61.4 2.8 0.0 0.8 
Duncanville 35 62.2 2.3 0.0 0.5 
Region 10 38.1 57.1 4.3 0.1 0.6 
State 36.3 52.2 6.7 3.5 1.2 
Source:  Texas Education Agency (TEA), Academic Excellence Indicator System 
(AEIS), 2002-03 
 
In 2002-03, Texas school districts budgeted an average of 51.9 percent of their 
funds from the local property tax and 40.5 percent in revenue from the state (Exhibit 4-3).  
In CHISD, those percentages are 59.4 and 34.4 percent, respectively.  The averages for 
the region are 65.5 and 27.2 percent, respectively.  Since state funding is based on per 
student property values, the comparisons indicate that CHISD values per student are 
higher than the region while lower than the state average. 
Exhibit 4-3 
CHISD, Region 10, State and Peer District 
Sources of Budgeted Revenue as a Percentage of Total Budgeted Revenue  
2002-03 
Entity Local Property Tax 
% 






Duncanville 59.6 4.7 33.4 2.3 
Cedar Hill 59.4 4.4 34.4 1.8 
De Soto 51.2 3.7 43.0 2.1 
Grand Prairie 39.0 3.9 56.9 0.2 
Region 10 65.5 5.4 27.2 1.9 
State 51.9 4.2 40.5 3.5 




The state assigns funds for school program costs based on property values per 
student.  CHISD’s developmental industrial growth and the corresponding increase in 
property values have caused an increase in the proportionate funding of program costs 
from local property taxes.  From 1997-98 through 2002-03, local revenue as a percentage 
of total funding for CHISD increased by 48.5 percent.  At the same time, state revenue as 
a percentage of total funding decreased by 34.2 percent (Exhibit 4-4). 
Exhibit 4-4 
CHISD Sources of Revenue as a Percentage of Total Revenue 
1997-98 through 2001-02 
















Local Property Tax 40.0 45.8 43.6 54.5 54.8 59.4 48.5 
Other local and 
intermediate 5.8 5.7 4.6 4.9 6.0 4.4 (2.4) 
State 52.3 46.7 50.2 38.6 37.4 34.4 (34.2) 
Federal 1.9 1.8 1.6 2.0 1.8 1.8 (0.5) 
Source:  TEA, Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS), 
1997-98 through 2002-03 
 
District Mission Statement 
 
The Mission Statement of the district states that “with the partnership of parents 
and cooperation with the community, the school district will educate and produce 
graduates who are fully enabled to successfully engage as responsible and contributing 
members of our rapidly changing society” (Cedar Hill I.S.D., State of the School District 
brochure, November, 2003).  The four-year high school completion rate for the Cedar 
Hill Independent School District is approximately 90 percent.  This is accomplished with 
a total district budget of approximately $49 million for the 2003-04 year. 
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In August 2003, CHISD’s adopted tax rate was $1.61 ($1.43 maintenance and 
operations plus $.17 debt service) after a series of increases and decreases from the 1996-
97 adopted tax rate of $1.89 ($1.35 maintenance and operations plus $0.54 debt service).  
At the same time, CHISD’s property value reached $238,032 per student, compared to 
the state average of $242,809 per student. 
Exhibit 4-5 
Cedar Hill ISD Comptroller Tax Rates, Assessed Property Values 
And Per Student Property Values 




















Operations tax rate $1.35 $1.28 $1.45 $1.31 $1.43 $1.43 $1.50 11 
Interest and Sinking 
fund tax rate $0.54 $0.48 $0.33 $0.32 $0.20 $0.19 $0.18 (66.6) 
Total Tax Rate $1.89 $1.76 $1.78 $1.63 $1.63 $1.62 $1.68 11 
Total Property Value 
(000s) $774,628 $864,911 $953,482 $1,117,885 $1,268,085 $1,532,292 $1,745,011 12.5 
Total Students 5,806 6,073 6,144 6,173 6,481 6,702 6,922 19 
Value per student $133,419 $142,419 $155,189 $181,093 $195,662 $220,760 $238,032 10.4 





On the expenditure side, Exhibit 4-6 shows how CHISD distributed budgeted 
funds in 2002-03 compared to the state average.  Of particular significance is CHISD’s 




CHISD and State Total Budgeted Expenditures by Function as a Percentage of Total 
Budgeted Expenditures 
2002-03 




Instruction (11,95) $25,599,198 61.0 $15,258,107,372 57.0 
Instructional-Related Services (12,13) $1,145,499 2.7 $815,176,913 3.0 
Instructional Leadership (21) $535,740 1.3 $360,073,948 1.3 
School Leadership (23) $2,397,189 5.7 $1,588,708,640 5.9 
Support Services-Student (31,32,33) $1,520,459 3.6 $1,204,538,130 4.5 
Student Transportation (34) $210,000 0.5 $788,729,993 2.9 
Food Services (35) $2,011,033 4.8 $1,470,996,886 5.5 
Co-curricular/Extracurricular Activities 
(36) 
$1,265,514 3.0 $682,584,402 2.5 
Central Administration (41) $1,683,074 4.0 $1,090,220,713 4.1 
Plant Maintenance & Operations (51) $4,764,450 11.4 $2,995,707,896 11.2 
Security & Monitoring Services (52) $327,800 0.8 $181,806,687 0.7 
Data Processing Services (53) $513,483 1.2 $348,481,432 1.3 
Total Budgeted Expenditures $41,973,439 100.0 $26,785,133,012 100.0 
Source:  TEA, PEIMS, 2002-03. 
 
A longitudinal presentation of expenditures for the school district is presented in 
Exhibit 4-7.  There were increases in all expenditures function areas during this 
timeframe.  The largest increases occurred in Security and Monitoring Services (276.8 
percent); Student Transportation (228.1 percent); and Instructional Leadership (206.3 
percent).  In comparison, the state averages increased in each function by 125.6 percent; 




A Longitudinal Presentation of CHISD Budgeted Expenditures by Function 
FY 1996-2002 
Function FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 Percent Change 
























































Student Transportation (34) $64,000 $87,600 $2,275 $41,422 $166,570 $207,875 $210,000 228.1 




















Central Administration (41) $946,086 $1,104,588 $967,959 $1,171,788 $1,312,893 $1,344,920 $1,683,074 77.9 








































































Source:  TEA, PEIMS FY1996-FY2002 
 
On a per student basis from 1997-98 to 2002-03, CHISD’s expenditures have 
increased 42.5 percent (Exhibit 4-8).  Instruction and instructional leadership spending 
has increased 29.2 percent, or $807, per student while school leadership spending has 
increased 42.1 percent, or $97, per student.  The large increase in non-operations costs 
results from the inclusion of debt service for 2001-2003, while excluded in other years. 
Exhibit 4-8 
CHISD Expenditures per Student 

















$2,758 $2,914 $3,306 $3,421 $3,318 $3,565 29.2 
School Leadership $230 $236 $249 $276 $272 $327 42.1 
Central Administration $182 $158 $190 $203 $193 $230 26.3 
Other operating $1,295 $1,210 $1,423 $1,550 $1,552 $1,604 23.8 
Total operations $4,465 $4,518 $5,168 $5,450 $5,335 $5,725 28.2 
Total non-operations $207 $233 $170 $161 $870 $983 374.8 
Total per student $4,672 $4,751 $5,338 $5,611 $6,205 $6,659 42.5 




The fiscal crisis of the Cedar Hill Independent School District stemmed from 
several problems that became more severe between FY 2000-01 and FY 2001-02.  
During this time frame district salaries increased by 4% at the mid-point and district 
health benefits costs increased by 91.4%.  The district was also experiencing a negative 
fund balance, which it had experienced since 1994-95 (Appendix C).  A visual depiction 
of the situation can be viewed in Exhibit 4-8. 
Source:  TEA, PEIMS, FY 1995-2000 
An investigation of the relationship between expenditures and revenue could serve as a 
prelude to the crisis (Exhibit 4-10). 















Source:  TEA, PEIMS, FY 1995-2000 
Expenditures had exceeded revenues in both FY 2000-01 and FY 2002-03(Appendix B). 
The financial problems of Cedar Hill Independent School District were serious, 
yet incremental.  The TEA issued a ‘substandard achievement’ rating to the school 
district because of failure for indicator 1 and 18.  Both of these indicators dealt with 
negative fund balance and insufficient total fund balance (Appendix C).  The instrument 
is designed to rate a district in the ‘substandard achievement’ category if it answers NO 
to indicator 1.  In February 2002, the Comptroller announced her decision to review the 
Cedar Hill Independent School District through a Texas School Performance Review 
(TSPR). 
The district experienced student growth as well as increases in total staff in a ten-
year period.  The enrollment of the district grew from 5,279 (1994-95) to 7,331 (2002-
03), which accounted for a 38.9 percent increase.  While total staff increases included 
548 (1994-95) to 899 (2002-03) that reflected a 64 percent increase.  The non-teaching 
















staff increases were the driving change and cost during this timeframe.  Furthermore, the 
school district pupil/teacher ratio had grown from 14.9 (2000-01) to 15.7 (2002-03). 
Table 1 
Cedar Hill ISD 
Student Enrollment – Professional Employees/Total Staff 







1993-94 5,057 355/547 9.24 64.9 
1994-95 5,279 369/548 9.63 67.3 
1995-96 5,615 398/591 9.50 67.3 
1996-97 5,806 432/658 8.82 65.6 
1997-98 6,073 472/725 8.37 65.1 
1998-99 6,144 485/769 7.98 63.0 
1999-2000 6,173 497/784 7.87 63.4 
2000-01 6,481 515/805 8.05 63.9 
2001-02 6,941 535/856 8.10 62.5 
2002-03 7,331 568/899 8.15 63.1 
Source:  TEA, PEIMS, 1993-94 through 2002-03 
 
The ratio of employees to total staff had grown 2.7 percent, which could be 
explained with the growth the number of campuses throughout the district.  While the 
ratio of total staff to enrollment decreased by 11.8 percent during this timeframe.  This 
ratio of total staff to enrollment despite the decrease fell within the standards of the 
FIRST indicator #17 for a school district of this size. 
Organizational Plan 
The Cedar Hill Independent School Board instituted goals which included the 
following targets:  1) Achieve a fund balance of 10 percent by the close of 2004 and 15 
percent by close of 2007 (Cedar Hill Independent Board Minutes, August 26, 2003).  
Other board priorities included raising or improving the underlying bond ratings from 
BBB+ by 2005-06.  Also, a changing of the Fiscal Year (July 1- June 30) was adopted to 
better align with Federal funding (Cedar Hill Independent Board Minutes, February 9, 
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2004).  The Board approved the purchase of the Skyward PC Finance and Student 
System on April 14, 2003 (Cedar Hill Independent School District Board Minutes).  
Finally, there was a reorganization of CHISD Business and Support Services to better 
assist in internal transactions (Exhibit 4-11).   
The creation of the CHISD’s Chief Financial Officer position realigned the 
responsible for budget and finance, payroll and employee benefits.  The Associate 
Superintendent, Business and Support Services had previously administered this position.  
After the reorganization, the Associate Superintendent was taken out of the finance area 
and placed solely in operations. 
Exhibit 4-11 
Organization of CHISD Business and Support Services 
2002-03 
 
Chief Financial Officer 
 
 
Lead Payroll Clerk 
and Secretary to Associate 
Superintendent 
 
Assistant Payroll Clerk 
 
Director, 





(student activity funds) Lead Accounts 
 
Benefits Specialist  Accounts Payable Clerk 
 
Warehouse Supervisor Accounts Payable Clerk 
and Fixed Assets Clerk and Textbook Clerk 
Source:  CHISD Chief Financial Officer. 
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The next section contains interviews with several leading stakeholders that were 
critical in terms of understanding the fiscal decision-making within this school district. 
On-Site Interviews 
On June 1, 2004, the researcher traveled to Cedar Hill, Texas to interview the 
following individuals:  superintendent (S. #1) who served the district for the last three 
years and was hired in June 2001; chief financial officer (CFO) who had been in that 
position since September 2002; and the school board president (S.B.P. #1) who was 
finishing her second year as president and was first elected to the board in 1994.  The 
TEA Representative was interviewed in Austin, Texas on June 15, 2004. 
Analysis 
The Cedar Hill Independent School District experienced a period of time where the 
political process determined many of the budgetary decisions. 
“Board members are no longer here; rightly or wrongly.  I don’t 
believe that they were personally responsible but they were held 
personally responsible and when the State Comptroller’s office came in 
and made such a big to do about it people in the community snapped up on 
that.  They got the blame.  I didn’t and I’ve been here in the same capacity 
they were.   So why that happened to them; it was just the timing; they 
were definitely held accountable” (S.B.P. #1, 2004). 
 
Despite growing enrollments and revenues the district continued to experience 
budget deficits.  “I don’t believe that it was because I believe that the numbers came in 
consistently higher.  They saw the growth and they knew what was happening and let’s 
just spend, spend, and spend” (CFO, 2004).  Also, “I can remember a time years ago 
when it was wouldn’t that be nice if we could do that oh no, let’s spend it on something 
else” (S.B.P. #1, 2004).  The administrative team was attempting to handle the hard 
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economic decisions with unclear goals, unclear technology and fluid participants.  
Furthermore, there was an absence of communication regarding the ramifications of the 
negative fund balances. 
The new superintendent addressed the crisis by implementing rational approaches 
to budgeting.  He instituted common rational reforms to the budget including both 
program budgeting and long-term strategic choices on expenditure levels compared to 
annual periodicity. 
“We have adopted a practice (first year I came here) the board considered 
and approved revenue assumptions early on to guide the staff in 
developing on the revenue side. Similarly, we have been considering 
expenditure assumptions.  But, we take assumptions and use that to project 
out at least one year and sometimes two” (S. #1, 2004). 
 
Yet, the researcher is alarmed at the comment of, “the superintendent and I have 
publicly stated that our budget philosophy is to underestimate revenue and overestimate 
expenditures” (CFO, 2004).  This type of mentality could promote distrust by 
policymakers of school officials.  A more sound practice would entail making accurate 
estimates using accurate data. 
The superintendent demonstrated leadership by clearly identifying and 
communicating to his board the direction the district must pursue in order to become 
economically viable.  The board’s transformation was described as follows:  
“I saw a big difference in the board in terms of their attitude in regards to 
the fund balance.  It had no importance then it got a little important then it 
got real important.  It changed so much with the personalities on the board 
and with the influence of the superintendent (S.B.P. #1, 2004). 
 
The district utilized the TEA tools as both resources and guidance.  Yet, their major 
influences in solving the fiscal problems of the district appeared to be in terms of outside 
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consultants, improved computer software and the Comptroller’s (2002) report.  All of 
which more closely follow the rational decision-making model. 
Thematic Responses 
 
 The respondent’s answers are organized by research question themes to furnish 
the reader more insight into pre and post crisis period for the school district. 
Major Financial Duties 
Interviewer:  What are the major duties relative to fiscal decisions or financial 
oversight in current job? 
S. #1:  Making budgetary recommendations to the school board both relative to 
budget and well as tax rates.  Also, in terms of budgeting, I provide the 
supervision of the chief financial officer. 
CFO:  The actual departments that I supervise are the Payroll Department, the 
Purchasing Department, the Accounts Payable, the Accounts Receivable, and all 
other budgetary aspects.  Basically, I do all the forecasting of the revenue, setting 
up the budget and I am the designee of the superintendent and I together with him 
set that budget.  You put all those players and pieces together.  There are lots of 
little things that I sort of forget about from day to day.  The big portion is the 
investment; I am the investment officer of the school district. 
S.B.P. #1:  Well, technically the board approves the budget. 
Awareness of the Fiscal Problems of the District 




S. #1:  As I contemplated making application I was aware of a history of negative 
fund balances.  I would say that they became most apparent when the 
comptroller’s office expressed their concern. 
CFO:  Well, I have some great resources with TEA and confidants that are 
always very open with me.  The first thing I do if I am looking for a position I call 
up the snapshot date it tells me a lot of things I need to know.  The snapshot told 
me they had a negative fund balance and as I went back it told me that they had a 
negative fund balance for numerous years.  That tells me right there that is a “red 
flag.”  I am not afraid of a “red flag.” In fact, I would prefer to go to a district that 
has financial problems and be in a district in which they already had done 
everything correctly.  Between the snapshot, the TEA public information website 
and some resources that I had been checking I knew that Cedar Hill had some 
problems.  But they have some great advantages.  Cedar Hill had hope.  They had 
hope in the sense that they have an increasing tax base here and increasing kids. 
S.B.P. #1:  Well, it isn’t like a light clicked on and there was a problem.  There 
was a growing problem there is always a situation a changing situation of what 
the state legislature decides.  What the amount of state aid, the formula all of that 
changes constantly.  So it didn’t all happen all in one day.  I would say it has been 
an ongoing process my entire term.  The fund deficit situation that is more recent.  
That evolved also.  I became most aware of it a year or two before the current 
superintendent came probably in 1999. 
 
 95 
Circumstances Prior to the Period of Fiscal Insolvency 
Interviewer:  What were the circumstances immediately prior to the 
‘substandard’ rating? 
S. #1:  What I have been told in general was that administration would take 
budget recommendations to the school board.  School board members, 
individually and understandably and predictably would express concern about 
needed program reduction.  Administration would go back and come back with 
projected revenue necessary to cover the program costs, the needed reductions.  
When I arrived there were some excess staff members primarily at the high school 
and consequently more the first year were coming through at the high school at 
about 6 percent. 
CFO:  I don’t know the history.  I hear people talk and see the facts.  We as 
administrators knew what the revenue and the expenditures were.  They 
consistently out extended their revenues.  It wasn’t the on the revenue side; we 
did not miscalculated enrollment or tax base.  None of these were the case…it 
was that they consistently outspent their revenues.  You can’t do that consistently.  
I think it was just a matter of never telling anybody “No”.  Nobody wanted to 
make the tough decision to do that.  I’m sorry not today; not going to happen 
today.  They didn’t seem to have a clear philosophy.  Not able to say no but there 
was not vision.  Doctor and I have a plan that puts us with a savings account that 
fills up every year.  It fills up every year because we force it to fill up.  There 
isn’t; I don’t know if there was always that philosophy.  My school board can 
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hold me accountable...you gave me this handout that said this is how you were 
creating a savings account.  If there isn’t a savings account at the end of the year 
then predictions were incorrect or did we spend the money?  Number one, we 
can’t spend the money because we didn’t budget to spend the money.  The only 
thing that can fall apart, some part of the piggy bank plan didn’t fall into place.  It 
is so conservative that it has to happen.  A real philosophy; it is pretty much how 
you run your household. 
S.B.P. #1:  We are not in this business to make money so the money comes in and 
goes out.  A few little glitches here or there can make a big difference.  I guess the 
fund balance is the barometer of how well your district is doing…and it did all of 
the sudden go way down. 
Contributing Factors 
Interviewer:  Was error in predicting revenue or enrollment a contributing 
factor? 
S. #1:  The best of my knowledge…it was on the revenue side. 
CFO:  I don’t believe that it was because I believe that the numbers came in 
consistently higher.  They saw the growth and they knew what was happening and 
let’s just spend, spend, and spend.  Well, you can’t out spend and you have to plan 
accordingly because it is really easy to let different factions spend and we don’t 
ever say no. 
S.B.P. #1:  Well, I think that it is common sense that if your expenses aren’t as 
great then you have more money left over.  My point may be different than the 
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others I saw a big difference in the board in terms of their attitude in regards to 
the fund balance.  It had no importance then it got a little important then it got real 
important.  It changed so much with the personalities on the board with the 
influence of the superintendent. 
Key Factors to Regaining Fiscal Solvency 
Interviewer:  In your opinion, what were the key factors, which contributed to 
regaining fiscal solvency? 
S. #1:  Certainly, better and more conservative revenue forecasting…there were 
additional staff brought into the business function, the creation of a CFO position 
(2002); the previous associate superintendent for business operation was taken out 
of the finance function and put solely in operations.  As the school district grew 
rapidly from a 2A to a 5A school district there was virtually no breaking up the 
business support staff.  We were clearly understaffed on that side. 
There were several steps that were undertaken: 
1) The District changed financial advisors (2002) – not that we were 
getting poor financial advice but we had been 28 years with same 
financial advisor; when that occurs the relationship becomes too 
familiar. 
2) The District changed external auditors (2001). 
3) The District considered revising tax collections; in an arrangement or 
partnership with the city of Cedar Hill.  We looked at the advantages 
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of going with Dallas County as well as a set of consortium of 
neighboring school districts.  We opted to stay with the city. 
4) On the expenditure side, we found that many of the TEA budgetary 
codes were not being accurately utilized in budget development.  In 
the second year we reorganized expenditures through a series of 
budget amendments.  We were using management software that was 
poorly suited for our needs.  We were their largest clients… in 2003-
04 we went with the Skyward software system. 
5) We did reduce teaching positions across the district by 38 positions.  
We took those recaptured dollars and invested them into salaries in 
order to make salaries market competitive.  We did reorganize central 
office level…with a reduction in two positions.  The reduction wasn’t 
all that significant in dollars and it flattens the organization.  On the 
instruction side, an assistant superintendent reported to an associate 
superintendent…as the organization has been flattened the nine (ten) 
directors now report to the superintendent.  That is probably more than 
would be recommended by organizational specialist.  Yet, it works in 
the short term in order to be particularly hands-on.  I am not sure how 
long we will stay with this…we will stay at least to 2003-04. 
6) The District sought to eliminate programs…we eliminated block 
scheduling at the high school and the middle school that is the only 
way to reduce the most number of teachers.  I would say to you that 
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was purely a fiscal decision, a matter of fiscal priority.  No one was 
advocating that 7 period day was better instructional time.  We did 
make a move towards our highest priority, which was getting salaries 
up.  We had been historically lower; Duncanville, DeSoto, and Cedar 
Hill had turnover rates of teaching staffs of 19-25%.  And historically, 
particularly DeSoto and Cedar Hill had been well off the Dallas 
market.  So there was quite a pattern of teachers joining those districts 
three or four years and going to higher paying North Dallas school 
districts.  Both Duncanville and Cedar Hill are close to that market 02-
03 and 03-04 teacher turnover rate dropped down to 19% and our 
refined teacher turnover rate and you take out those …was 10%.  State 
wide we are talking 15-16%.  In the Metro areas there is more 
mobility. 
7) The District addressed the concept of Block Scheduling, which we had 
been on for 7-8 years; it was well accepted; teachers at the high school 
had taught on nothing but the block schedule.  We made a fiscal 
decision; administration recommended to the board a fiscal decision, 
which did result in the elimination of 38 teaching positions in which 
17 of those were at the high school and then we said to the high school 
here are your staffing announcements for next year you determine the 
instructional schedule… We had largely determined that when we 
made that but in fact, they had made the determination.  There are 
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some districts (Ennis) in similar situation but I don’t think that they 
reduced quite the numbers at the high school.  Their teachers opted to 
stay on block scheduling. 
8) The State system is not particularly conducive to multi year 
budgeting…of course, we have trimmed a number of revenue 
measures, expenditures measures, trimmed student enrollment data, 
and we use a demographer to assist in enrollment projections.  We 
have adopted a practice (first year I came here) the board considered 
and approved revenue assumptions early on to guide the staff in 
developing on the revenue side.  Similarly, we have been considering 
expenditure assumptions.  But, we take assumptions and use that to 
project out at least one year and sometimes two.  
The State mandated changes – TSPR; I would have preferred not having TSPR; I 
would have preferred consultants…it did give me political cover needed to make 
changes.  TSPR caused us to move more aggressively or rapidly. 
CFO:  The respondent outlined a “written laundry list” of some of the issues that 
were addressed specifically in the last two years by the Cedar Hill ISD: 
1) The District used real data to decide the self-insurance issue, along with the 
expertise of a consultant and site-based committee.  The District reached a 
resolution by going with the State of Texas TRS Active-care and getting out 
of the insurance business. 
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2) The District changed the fiscal year to align with the Federal Programs.  
Also, this enables principals/directors to purchase items with their new 
budgets for the appropriate year.  Furthermore, over time, this will allow us 
to look at each budget year by school year.  Now, a small portion of the 
August school year, both expenditures and revenues, are missing.  There is a 
one time only advantage to switching that creates an excess of budgeted 
funds (10 month year versus 12 month year).  This savings will be used to 
collapse our health insurance fund that currently is in the “red.” 
3) The District implemented 100% of the financial recommendations by the 
Comptroller’s Office in a TSPR review. 
4) The District realigned the coding structure.  In particular, complying with 
PEIMS codes and then teaching principals and directors the codes that are 
used by TEA and ultimately that we must use. 
5) The school board stated as a goal to increase our bond rating.  We did not 
receive a PSF1 backing from the state the last time bonds were sold by Cedar 
Hill ISD.  This year not only did we receive PSF backing from the State but 
our underlying rating was increased. 
6) The District has changed software companies effective September 1, 2003.  
This implementation was long overdue and the financed software is now 
windows based and very user friendly. 
                                                 
1 As of October 31, 2002, the principal value of 2,874 bond issues outstanding in Texas school districts totaled nearly $29 billion, 
according to the Municipal Advisory Council of Texas.  About $26 billion was guaranteed by the Permanent School Fund (PSF), 
which is managed by the State Board of Education with the help of investment advisors and Texas Education Agency (TEA) staff.  
The statewide school debt is approaching the maximum amount that can be guaranteed by the PSF. 
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7) The superintendent and I have publicly stated that our budget philosophy is 
to underestimate revenue and overestimate expenditures.  Thus, by 
implementing this simple strategy, it creates an “automatic” fund balance 
each year. 
8) I have had two positions retire this year and I was able to replace them with 
experienced, qualified individuals that are adaptable to change.  The 
adaptability to change is a real key for my staff to be effective under my 
leadership style. The District reconciled of all checking accounts and 
investments are done within 20 days from the month’s end.  In the past, this 
process was sometimes behind schedule. 
S.B.P. #1:  All of that [changes in accounting procedures, additional staff in the 
business office, reduction in force, elimination of programs, multi-year budgeting 
planning, state mandated changes, better revenue forecasting] and another thing I 
could bring was a change in attitude on the board.  There was a renewed energy 
and renewed commitment that we did budget for the fund balance.  I can 
remember a time years ago when it was wouldn’t that be nice if we could do that 
oh no, let’s spend it on something else.  That was a dramatic change.  So much of 
it is luck.  We live at the whim of other people.  We are playing by the rules and 
the rules keep changing.  We have the advantage of a steady growth rate and as 
long as that is happening we have more money coming in. 
TEA Representative:  The most important area for building financial strength is 
cost reduction in the area of personnel.  A school district should understand how 
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many staff could be supported given the revenue characteristics of the school 
district, potential local revenue generating process from property taxes and state 
aid and also financing sources involving projects and grants.  The district should 
have the ability to quantify how many individuals can be supported on their 
payroll and the amount that can be left over that can be financed from the residual 
amount of revenues or the use of fund balance. 
Utilizing TEA Tools 
Interviewer:   How were the fiscal tools of the Texas Education Agency used in 
resolving the problem? 
S. #1:  We of course use the templates. There are both strengths and deficiencies 
with the templates. Our CFO from time to time contacts the TEA staff especially 
when revenue projections change with the legislature.  Our CFO’s experience in 
west Texas and her work with the regional service centers have been helpful.  
Seminars and professional development put on by the TEA are extremely helpful.  
We brought in an outside consultant unrelated to TEA to help us look at where we 
were at in terms of long-range projections and to make certain we were 
maximizing our revenues. 
CFO:  Well, I will say this up front they are my friends.  I will calculate the first 
report card long before they give me the results based on this year’s template.  I 
have a problem with the “Omar” template as I still call it that it will really predict 
my finances.  I will call associates before I will try to reach TEA.  They (TEA) 




A review of PEIMS data, board minutes, audit reports, financial records, 
management audit, and interviews with key informants indicated that the following were 
the circumstances immediately prior to and during the insolvency of the Cedar Hill 
Independent School District: 
1) There was a history of negative fund balances.  See Appendix B. 
2) Expenditures outpaced revenues. 
3) Even though the enrollment of the school district had grown, there was excess 
staffing at the high school. 
4) The district supported ongoing program expenses with incurred debt. 
5) There was virtually no accurate revenue forecasting. 
6) Despite the growth of the school district the business office had been 
understaffed. 
7) TEA budgetary codes were not being accurately utilized in budget development. 
8) TEA denied the Permanent School Fund (PSF) guarantee for the October 2001 
bonds costing the district $248,000 in bond insurance premiums in lieu of the 
normal $300 Permanent School Fund guarantee fee. 
9) The district has gone from an already low $612,623 (2.6 percent) fund balance in 
1996-97, to a negative $2.7 million (0 percent) in 2000-01. 
10) A projected positive fund balance of approximately $900,000 at the end of 2001-
02 was not reached because the district had not taken into account the negative 
fund balance in the health insurance fund. 
 
 105 
11) There was no strong system of internal controls. 
12) There was no stabilizing financial management. 
13) There was no streamlining of organization and management using highly 
qualified staff. 
14) There was no enforcing contract oversight and compliance. 
The key factors identified by those interviewed as contributing to regaining fiscal 
solvency were the following: 
1) Restructuring the financial management’s organization and hiring a Chief 
Financial Officer. 
2) Adopting policies to prevent deficit budgeting and amending deficit budget. 
3) Adopting procedures to set premiums and to adjusting contributions to the 
district’s self-funded health plan based upon actual projections.  Monitoring 
actual activity quarterly to ensure solvency of the plan. 
4) Reorganizing central office administration and applying industry-staffing 
formulas at campus levels. 
5) Implementing procedures for data collection, review and submission to ensure the 
integrity of Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS) 
submissions. 
6) Obtaining competitive proposals for external audit services every five years, and 
hiring an internal auditor. 
7) Consolidating maintenance and custodial management. 
8) Establishing offsetting controls for cash and investment transactions. 
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Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District 
Financial Ratios 
The researcher applied four descriptive financial ratios to the Uvalde 
Consolidated Independent School District.  Saul (1996) studied the possibility of using 
financial ratios as a tool for analyzing and predicting insolvency in California school 
districts.  In the first ratio, R-3 or Reserve for Economic Uncertainties to Total 
Expenditures, the researcher again substituted the Ending Fund Balance in the General 
Fund for the Reserve for Economic Uncertainties.  For the FY 2000-01 the ratio of 
Ending Fund Balance to Total Expenditures was negative $49,618/$32,674,534 or 0.  For 
FY 2001-02 this ratio was $201,271/$32,123,818 or .006.    For FY 2002-03 the ratio was 
$779,818/$33,291,604 or .0234.  There is a substantial increase during this time frame, 
which indicates movement of the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District 
toward solvency. 
The second ratio applied to the Uvalde Consolidated School District was R-13, 
Property Tax as a Percentage of General Fund Revenues.  An increase in this ratio would 
indicate placement of a school district into the group of solvent districts; a decrease 
would indicate placement into the insolvent group.  During FY 2000-01 the ratio was 
$7,089,782/$32,865,452 or 0.2157.  For FY 2001-02 this ratio was 
$7,413,495/$32,158,345 or 0.23053.  In FY 2002-03 revenues from property tax was 
$7,902,038 while general fund revenues totaled $33,351,758.  The ratio became 0.23693. 
The third ratio used was R-17, Cash to Current Liabilities to test the ability of a 
school district to meet current obligations immediately.  For FY 2000-01 this ratio was 
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$4,312,196/$4,070,933 or 1.059.  In FY 2001-02, the ratio was $4,135,538/$3,043,807 or 
1.358.  In FY 2002-03 the cash was $5,697,389 and the liabilities were $2,190,728.  
Thus, the ratio for FY 2002-03 was 2.600.  An increase in this ratio would indicate the 
solvent group.  The FY 2003-04 shows a substantial increase in cash and a sizable 
decrease in liabilities. 
The final ratio used was R-22, Benefits to Total Expenditures.  An increase in this 
ratio would suggest placement into the insolvent group; a decrease would suggest 
solvency.  For FY 2000-01 the ratio of Benefits to Total Expenditures for the Uvalde 
Consolidated School District was $4,044,037/$32,674,534 or 0.12.  For FY 2001-02 the 
ratio became $4,294,211/$32,123,818 or 0.133.  In FY 2002-03 the ratio became 
$4,546,814/$33,291,604 or 0.136.  For this particular ratio a decrease indicates placement 
in the solvent group.  For the last three years, the trend appears to be increasing, which 
would place the Uvalde CISD toward the insolvent group. 
The results of the application of the four financial ratios to the Uvalde CISD are 
provided in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Uvalde Consolidate Independent School District Ratios 
 FY 2000-01 FY 2001-02 FY 2002-03 
R-3 0 0.006 0.0234 
R-13 0.215 0.230 0.236 
R-17 1.059 1.358 2.600 
R-22 0.12 0.133 0.136 
R-3 - Reserve for Economic Uncertainties to Total Expenditures. 
R-13 – Property tax as a percentage of total General Fund revenue. 
R-17 – Cash to Current Liabilities 





The Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District is located approximately 
83 miles west of San Antonio, Texas.  The district is classified by the University 
Interscholastic League (UIL) as a 4A high school district, which means it has a student 
enrollment of 900 to 1,924. The district serves 5,197 students from pre-kindergarten 
through grade 12.  It serves an area of 1,150.5 square miles with the majority of the 
district in Uvalde County with a small portion extending into both Real and Zavala 
Counties.  This school district has one Dalton Early Childhood Center; 4 elementary 
schools; 2 middle schools (Batesville School, Uvalde Junior High); and one high school. 
As of the 2003-04 school year the district’s ethnic diversity was 0.5 percent African 
American; 14 percent White; 85 percent Hispanic; and 0.4 percent Other. 
Exhibit 4-12 details the enrollment and demographic characteristics of Uvalde 
CSD, its neighboring peer districts, Regional Education Service Center (Region 20) and 
the state. 
Exhibit 4-12 
Student Enrollment and Demographics 
Uvalde CISD, Peer Districts, Region and State 
2003-04 
















Uvalde CISD 5,197 0.5 85 14 0.4 0.0 74 
Sabinal ISD 549 0.7 68 30 0.7 0.0 66 
Crystal City ISD 2,074 0.9 98 1 0.0 0.0 88 
Pearsall ISD 2,278 0.8 88 11 0.3 0.0 82 
Region 20 343,821 7 65 27 1.3 0.3 62 
State 4,239,911 14 43 40 3 0.3 52 
Source:  Texas Education Agency (TEA); Public Education Information 
Management System (PEIMS), 2003-04. 




UCISD has less business and less residential property value than the state 
average, yet it has more than all peer district averages (Exhibit 4-13).  The higher 
percentage of residential value for UCISD indicates that local residents carry most of the 
local property tax burden to fund school operations.  Land accounts for more than 18 
percent of UCISD’s property value, which is lower than any of its peers but higher than 
the regional and state averages.  The higher land value indicates the potential for 
continued property development growth in UCISD. 
Exhibit 4-13 
Uvalde CISD, Region 20, State and Peer District Property Values by Category 
as a Percentage of Total Property Value 
2002-03 
District % Business %Residential % Land % Oil and Gas % Other 
Sabinal ISD 17 40 42 0.0 1.0 
UCISD 33 46 18 0.2 1.9 
Crystal City ISD 32.9 29.0 28.0 8.9 1.2 
Pearsall ISD 32 29 31 4.2 3.1 
Region 20 30.5 60.9 7.4 0.3 0.9 
State 36.3 52.2 6.7 3.5 1.2 
Source:  Texas Education Agency (TEA), Academic Excellence Indicator System 
(AEIS), 2002-03 
 
The state assigns funds for school program costs based on property values per 
student.  UCISD’s developmental growth and the corresponding increase in property 
values have caused an increase in the proportion of funding coming from local property 
taxes.  From 1997-98 through 2002-03, local revenue as a percentage of total funding for 
UCISD increased by 19 percent.  At the same time, state revenue as a percentage of total 







UCISD Sources of Revenue as a Percentage of Total Revenue 
1997-98 through 2001-02 















Local Property Tax 19.8 18.3 20.6 22.4 23.1 23.57 19 
Other local and 
intermediate 3.4 3.6 3.0 2.2 2.1 2.36 (30.5) 
State 71.4 77.8 75.9 74.9 74.0 73.43 (2.8) 
Federal 5.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.65 (87.9) 
Source:  TEA, Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS), 
1997-98 through 2002-03 
 
In 2002-03, Texas school districts budgeted an average of 51.9% percent of their 
funds from the local property tax and 40.5 percent in revenue from the state (Exhibit 4-
15).  In UCISD, those percentages are 23.7 and 68.5 percent, respectively.  The averages 
for the region are 37.1 and 52.3 percent, closer to the state average. 
Exhibit 4-15 
UCISD, Region 20, State and Peer District 
Sources of Budgeted Revenue as a Percentage of Total Budgeted Revenue 2002-03 
Entity % Local Property 
Tax 
% Other Local and 
Intermediate 
% State % Federal 
Sabinal ISD 29.2 3.2 63.5 4.1 
UCISD 23.7 2.8 68.5 5.0 
Crystal City ISD 12.1 1.2 80.4 6.2 
Pearsall ISD 23.1 3.1 68.2 5.5 
Region 20 37.1 5.6 52.3 5.0 
State 51.9 4.2 40.5 3.5 
Source:  TEA, AEIS, 2002-03 
District Mission Statement 
 
The mission statement of the district states that “through effective leadership, 
comprehensive district and campus planning, a safe school environment, and 
participation from school staff, parents, students, and community members, the Uvalde 
Consolidated Independent School District commits to develop students who possess 
positive self-esteem and the knowledge and skills for future learning” (Uvalde C.I.S.D. 
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brochure, July, 2004).  The four-year high school completion rate for the Uvalde 
Consolidated Independent School District is 76.7 percent.  This is accomplished with a 
total district budget of approximately $34 million for the 2003-04 year.  In August 2003, 
UCISD’s adopted tax rate was $1.61 ($1.43 maintenance and operations plus $.17 debt 
service) after a series of increases from the 1996-97 adopted tax rate of $1.52 ($1.214 
maintenance and operations plus $0.306 debt service).  At the same time, UCISD’s 
property value reached $97,892 per student, compared to the state average of $242,809 
per student (Exhibit 4-16). 
Exhibit 4-16 
Uvalde CISD Comptroller Tax Rates, Assessed Property Values 
And Per Student Property Values 
1996-97 through 2002-03 
Category 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 Percentage Change 
Maintenance and 
Operations tax rate $1.214 $1.121 $1.155 $1.340 $1.400 $1.400 $1.434 17.7 
Interest and Sinking 
fund tax rate $0.306 $0.282 $0.365 $0.180 $0.120 $0.120 $0.179 (41.5) 
Total Tax Rate $1.520 $1.403 $1.520 $1.520 $1.520 $1.520 $1.613 6.1 
Total Property 
Value (000s) $383,589 $401,889 $410,393 $433,210 $470,040 $481,255 $508,746 32.6 
Total Students 5,462 5,307 5,293 5,323 5,221 5,203 5,197 (4.85) 
Value per student $70,229 $75,728 $77,535 $81,385 $90,029 $92,496 $97,892 39.3 




On the expenditure side, Exhibit 4-17 shows how UCISD distributed budgeted 
funds in 2002-03 compared to the state average.  Of particular significance is UCISD’s 
allocation to the instructional category, which is lower than the state average.  Also, the 
school district’s distribution for food service, central administration and co-
curricular/extracurricular activities is higher than the state average.  Food service is 
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higher in the UCISD because it has a higher percentage of lower socio-economic students 
(SES).  Transportation costs because of the large area of bus miles and food service costs 
make up the difference in terms of allocation to the instructional category. 
Exhibit 4-17 
UCISD and State Total Budgeted Expenditures by Function as a Percentage of Total 
Budgeted Expenditures 
2002-03 




Instruction (11,95) $16,351,762 54.3 $15,258,107,372 57.0 
Instructional-Related Services (12,13) $737,553 2.4 $815,176,913 3.0 
Instructional Leadership (21) $947,711 3.1 $360,073,948 1.3 
School Leadership (23) $1,682,297 5.6 $1,588,708,640 5.9 
Support Services-Student (31,32,33) $1,242,735 4.1 $1,204,538,130 4.5 
Student Transportation (34) $1,242,735 4.3 $788,729,993 2.9 
Food Services (35) $1,814,700 6.0 $1,470,996,886 5.5 
Co-curricular/Extracurricular Activities 
(36) 
$1,101,292 3.7 $682,584,402 2.5 
Central Administration (41) $1,336,436 4.4 $1,090,220,713 4.1 
Plant Maintenance & Operations (51) $3,328,080 11 $2,995,707,896 11.2 
Security & Monitoring Services (52) $188,631 0.6 $181,806,687 0.7 
Data Processing Services (53) $112,475 0.4 $348,481,432 1.3 
Total Budgeted Expenditures $30,139,996 100.0 $26,785,133,012 100.0 
Source:  TEA, PEIMS, 2002-03. 
A longitudinal presentation of expenditures for the school district is presented in 
Exhibit 4-18.  All expenditure function areas for Uvalde CISD increased with the 
exception of Instructional Related Services, which decreased by 6.4 percent.  This 
function on the state level increased by 62.3 percent.  The leading increases in spending 
for functional areas were Instructional Leadership (71.9) and Student Transportation 
(75.5) for Uvalde CISD.  The state averages in Instructional Related Services increased 
by 62.3 percent.  While increases in Instructional Leadership were 37.8 percent and in 





A Longitudinal Presentation of UCISD Budgeted Expenditures by Function 
FY 1996-2002 
Source:  TEA, PEIMS, FY 1996-FY 2002 
On a per student basis from 1997-98 to 2002-03, UCISD’s expenditures have 
increased 17.7 percent (Exhibit 4-19).  Instruction and instructional leadership spending 
has increased 11.3 percent, or $338, per student while school leadership spending has 





Function FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 Percentage Change 
Instruction (11,95) $14,356,153 $15,201,666 $15,270,300 $16,064,089 $16,186,858 $15,246,964 $16,351,762 13.9 
Instructional-Related 
Services (12,13) 
$788,088 $766,101 $800,616 $836,891 $749,276 $783,468 $737,553 (6.4) 
Instructional Leadership 
(21) 
$551,337 $671,107 $842,946 $741,267 $812,809 $742,721 $947,711 71.9 
School Leadership (23) $1,367,092 $1,519,022 $1,623,647 $1,631,508 $1,851,008 $1,804,826 $1,682,297 23.1 
Support Services-Student 
(31,32,33) 
$886,130 $918,544 $913,908 $1,008,981 $1,085,975 $1,016,688 $1,242,735 40.2 
Student Transportation 
(34) 
$738,443 $792,816 $1,034,925 $1,018,182 $1,176,183 $1,228,976 $1,296,324 75.5 




$707,863 $750,414 $839,617 $760,365 $860,640 $909,402 $1,101,292 55.6 
Central Administration 
(41) 
$939,082 $975,676 $1,053,132 $1,110,154 $1,257,847 $1,388,138 $1,336,436 42.3 
Plant Maintenance & 
Operations (51) 
$2,330,641 $2,732,232 $2,695,239 $2,745,308 $2,847,664 $3,342,378 $3,328,080 42.8 
Security & Monitoring 
Services (52) 
$0 $117,739 $122,539 $233,852 $243,916 $247,597 $188,631 60.2 
Data Processing Services 
(53) 
$105,508 $87,206 $106,604 $104,725 $106,376 $111,425 $112,475 6.6 
Total Budgeted 
Expenditures 




UCISD Expenditures per Student 















Instruction and Instructional 
Leadership 
$2,991 $3,044 $3,157 $3,256 $3,073 $3,329 11.3 
School Leadership $286 $307 $307 $355 $347 $324 13.2 
Central Administration $184 $199 $209 $241 $267 $257 39.6 
Other operating $1,503 $1,593 $1,626 $1,739 $1,843 $1,890 25.7 
Total operations $4,964 $5,143 $5,298 $5,591 $5,530 $5,799 16.8 
Total per student $5,440 $5,847 $5,922 $6,258 $6,174 $6,406 17.7 
Source:  TEA, PEIMS, 1997-98 through 2002-03 
The increase in central administration (39.6 percent) appears significant during 
this time frame. 
Historical Summary 
The fiscal crisis of the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District stems 
from several problems that became more severe between FY 2000-01 and FY 2001-02.  
It was during this time frame district student enrollment decreased by 1.5 percent (Exhibit 
4-20) while staffing increased by 16.7 percent (Exhibit 4-21). 
Source:  TEA, PEIMS, FY 1995-2000 











Source:  TEA, PEIMS, FY 1995-2000 
The district was also experiencing a negative fund balance, which began to appear 
in 1994-95 (Appendix C).  This can also be viewed in Exhibit 4-22 below. 
Source:  TEA, PEIMS, FY 1995-2000 
Expenditures had exceeded revenues in FY 1997, FY 1998 and FY 2001 
(Appendix C).  Exhibit 4-23 also depicts the scenario of the school district from fiscal 
year 1995 through fiscal year 2000. 





























Source:  TEA, PEIMS, FY 1995-2000 
The financial problems of Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District were 
critical.  The district’s unreserved fund balance was unstable as it was greater than 20 
percent (TEA recommendation, FIRST indicator #19) over 2 fiscal years (Exhibit 4-24). 
Exhibit 4-24 
Fund Balance Instability 
Year Actual Fund Balance Less 20% Projected Balance 
1996-97 $2,626,920 $525,384 $2,101,536 
1997-98 $1,784,327 $356,865 $1,427,462 
1998-99 $172,117 $34,423 $137,694 
1999-2000 ($49,618) - - 
 
The TEA issued a ‘substandard achievement’ rating to the school district because 
of failure for indicator 1, 14, 17 and 18.  Both indicators 1 and 18 dealt with negative 
fund balance and insufficient total fund balance (Appendix C).  Indicators 14 and 17 
(Exhibit 4- 25) dealt with insufficient ratios of cash and investments to deferred revenues 
and ratios of students to total staff.  The instrument is designed to rate a district in the 
‘substandard achievement’ category if it answers NO to indicator 1. 
 

















Indicator #17 FIRST Worksheet 
Year Total # of Students Total # of Staff Ratio 
1997-1998 5,307 848 6.25 
1998-1999 5,293 847 6.24 
1999-2000 5,323 847.87 6.27 
2000-2001 5,221 847.59 6.15 
Source:  TEA, PEIMS, 1997 through 2001 
 
The recommended ratios for a school district this size was greater than 6.5 and less than 
14 (FIRST Worksheet, 2000). 
The district experienced negative student growth as well as increases in total staff 
in a ten-year period. The enrollment of the district declined from 5,277 (1994-95) to 
5,197 (2002-03) with a peak of 5,323 (1999-00).  While total staff increases included 681 
(1994-95) to 795 (2002-03).  Furthermore, the school district pupil/teacher ratio had 
grown from 13.6 (2000-01) to 14 (2002-03).  It is interesting to note the dominance of 
non-professional employees in the school district. 
Table 3 
Uvalde CISD 
Student Enrollment – Professional Employees/Total Staff 
Year Enrollment Professional 
Employees/Total Staff 
% Ratio of Employees to 
Total Staff 
1993-094 5,277 395/681 58.0 
1994-95 5,279 369/548 67.3 
1995-96 5,371 436/796 54.7 
1996-97 5,462 441/800 55.1 
1997-98 5,307 454/848 53.5 
1998-99 5,293 451/847 53.2 
1999-00 5,323 475/847 56.0 
2000-01 5,221 471/853 55.2 
2001-02 5,203 449/814 55.1 
2002-03 5,197 455/795 57.2 






In October of 2000, with a negative fund balance of nearly $31,000, the trustees 
for the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District implemented a new fund 
balance policy requiring that two and one-half months’ worth of operating funds be in 
reserve by October 2005 (Merritt, 2004). 
The district’s human resources were reorganized with the following key concepts 
in mind:  (a) elimination of a warehouse director to be assumed under the Executive 
Director of Business Services, (b) greater decision making for the uses of resources at the 
site level, (c) reduction of staff through attrition in the school district and business office, 
and (d) a change in accounting procedures through the office of Executive Director of 
Business Services. 
The next section contains interviews with several leading stakeholders that were 
critical in terms of understanding the fiscal decision-making within this school district. 
On-Site Interviews 
On June 7, 2004, the researcher traveled to Uvalde, Texas to interview the 
following individuals:  superintendent (S. #2) who was hired on July 20, 2000; Executive 
Director of Business Services (EDBS) who had been in that position since Thanksgiving, 
2001; and the school board president (S.B.P. #2).  He had just finished his first month as 
President and had served on the Board for seven years.  The TEA Representative was 




The Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District was plagued by a lack of 
vision in terms of budgeting and decision-making.  Leaders and stakeholders did not 
understand the dynamic relationship between a declining student enrollment coupled with 
the increase in staffing and its potential for economic disparity.  “The staff was not 
reacting with the budget plan based on what the data was telling them about” (EDBS, 
2004).  The school board was guided by an administration that was incremental in its 
regularity of spending.  The district was not able to handle the complex budget processes 
utilizing rational techniques. 
The administrative team of this school district utilized a more rational approach to 
budgeting following the TEA ‘substandard’ rating.  They introduced common rational 
reforms to the budgetary process.  “We implemented a modified zero-based budget 
planning process”(S. #2, 2004).  Strategic choices were outlined to the board early the 
reform process through “I told them that there were two things that would have to happen 
in order for us to a positive financial situation.  One, they needed a reduction in staff. 
Next, we needed to raise the tax rate” (S. #2, 2004).  Budget periodicity was also 
addressed through “in October 2000 I took to the Board a policy for a 5 year target for 
fund balance” (S. #2, 2004).   
The institution of board policy, which addressed the issue of negative fund 
balance as a multiple year quandary, bolsters further support for rational techniques in 
budget systems.  Also, the district through rational budgeting was able to reduce total 
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expenditures in “we went back to build our budget with a projection of 4,700 students we 
cut $75,000 from budget” (S. #2, 2004). 
The district leadership directed the budgeting process utilizing the steps toward 
rational behavior.  The superintendent understood the ramification of the economic 
circumstances that he was encountering before assuming the responsibilities of the job.  
This particular individual had encountered similar economic dilemmas in other districts.  
Equipped with this knowledge enabled him to clearly identify and communicate to the 
school board the direction in which the district must pursue in order to become 
economically solvent.   
The fiscal conditions of the district were clearly and correctly addressed through 
the recruitment of a knowledgeable business manager coupled with more advanced 
computer software packages.  Their loyalty and teamwork were also instrumental in 
terms of the achievement of success.  Finally, the school board through better 
communication and education concerning the fiscal problems were able to unite in their 
agreement to a long-term proposal that led to economic solvency.   
This knowledge base formed a foundation for the leadership team to select and 
pursue a course of action that enabled the district to rapidly respond to the criteria of the 
FIRST rating system. It is interesting to note that once the district had managed the 
deficit issue the political environment soon resurfaced with “even though we were half 
way there the people saw a positive fund balance and now you can relax all the stuff you 
have been doing” (EDBS, 2004). 
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The tools furnished by the TEA were used in resolving the problem in limited 
conditions in that the templates were useful in terms of organizing data and setting 
priorities.  Furthermore, the tools assisted the leadership of the district to communicate 
the priorities to both the community and the board of trustees.  Yet, those that were 
directly responsible for the development of the budget felt that more sophisticated 
methodologies were required in forecasting and processing of relational data. 
Thematic responses 
 The respondent’s answers are organized by research question themes to furnish 
the reader more insight into pre and post crisis period for the school district. 
Major Financial Duties 
Interviewer:  What are the major duties relative to fiscal decisions or financial 
oversight in current job? 
S. #2:  As superintendent I serve as chief executive officer of the school district.  
In that regard I am responsible for the development of the budget and to make 
sure we stay within revenues for the district.  So that we maintain a balanced 
operation and along with that I also have responsibility for all the facilities and 
that has to do fiscal decisions, and maintenance and operations of the facilities as 
well.  Those are probably the major areas.  Of course, I develop the budget in 
association with the Executive Director for Business Services and we present the 
budget for board approval.  The fiscal year for this district runs from September 1 
until the end of August.  We typically finish our budget preparation sometime in 
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August and we begin that preparation sometime around the later part or the first 
part of March. 
EDBS:  Basically, I am the key developer of the budget.  As far as a team we are 
viewed as an administrative cabinet and all the presentations from campus 
departments and I eventually act as a cabinet advisor to the board and 
superintendent and far as direction and what is feasible for the short term and long 
term.  That is one of the primary focuses of the position.  The others are budgetary 
control once we have a plan that is approved and it is put in place that we make 
sure there is compliance within the levels authorized and if there need be 
revisions to bring that to the attention of the superintendent and the board for 
possible required approval that we need to deviate from the financial plan.  My 
title is Executive Director of Business and Support Services.  A lot of my time is 
also taken up by overseeing bond construction effort.  There is also oversight of 
maintenance, operations, transportation, and PEIMS.  Besides the number 
crunching there is oversight of other support areas. 
S.B.P. #2:  Primarily getting reports and getting suggestions from the 
administration and determining policy for the district. 
Awareness of the Fiscal Problems of the District 
Interviewer:  When did you first learn of the fiscal problems in the school 
district? 
S. #2:  Actually, I first learned the fiscal problems before I took the job of 
superintendent.  I was heavily recruited by the Uvalde School District to serve as 
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their superintendent. When they started talking to me as their superintendent I 
want to say March of 2000 and when they asked me to consider the possibility of 
serving as their superintendent and then I went into the Internet and discovered 
that the district was in very poor financial health and I knew it would be a very 
big challenge in order to bring this district around and I explained that to the 
board when I interviewed with them. 
EDBS:  At our first board meeting…I came in after Thanksgiving 2001.  The first 
board meeting was the first Tuesday of the month so in December they presented 
the audit so that was the first I heard.   I guess I should be embarrassed to say that 
I didn’t do my research but when you get the opportunity to come back home it 
was a non-issue for me.  The audit cautioned of the negative fund balance.  From 
the get go the task was clearly identified. 
S.B.P. #2:  I believe in 1997 we had a large class graduate and approximately at 
the same time we passed a bond for campus improvements.  After that large class 
graduated we had a charter school started.  I think that a combination of things 
started things going in a bad direction.  The next year we an enrollment drop and 
we had an independent company forecast growth and they did feel that this was a 
problem.  Then the second year we lost some more students, which exacerbated 
the problem.  In 1998 or 1999 we started to realize that this would be an anomaly. 
Circumstances Prior to the Period of Fiscal Insolvency 




S. #2:  The one thing I did not know before I came to the district was that the 
district was overspending a million dollars of overpayment from the state.  So not 
only did they have a fund balance problem but they were actually spending more; 
about one million dollars that they were being over paid by the state because their 
ADA was down from what they thought it was and I discovered that when I came 
to the district and the financial situation of the district was a surprise to the board 
members because I remember them telling me that they did not realize that the 
district was in the financial situation it was in and one of the things that I decided 
to do was keep the board members very informed in that they would not be able to 
say like they did with me when I interviewed and told them of the financial 
condition of the district and they said we did not know that was the case with our 
district and I said yeah it is, I think boards trust administration and they should 
trust but sometimes administration does not have the knowledge to make the 
appropriate financial decisions and part of the reason is that they do not 
understand the total financial picture of school finance.  It is not that they are 
making wrong decisions, it that they don’t have everything they need to make the 
appropriate decisions and so I would make sure the board was very informed 
about everything we were doing as a district related to the financial position so 
that there could be no surprises and they would know exactly where we were 
financially.  I shared about the overpayment. 
EDBS:  Our ADA peaked in 1997 while our staffing was growing.  By the end of 
2001 for that audit with ADA down and staffing going up there was a crossing 
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and there was the deficit. Our revenues went down and we kept adding the biggest 
part of our budget plan, staff.  Not to speak negatively of anyone who was here 
but it seems like the understanding or the monitoring of the big picture of these 
two items was not understood; I did not know the “politics” of the time.  The staff 
was not reacting with the budget plan based on what the data was telling them 
about.  This is where the discussion needs to be at…you can talk nickels and dime 
stuff but what I found here is to pull away.  The state has a system to project the 
amount of revenue you earn.  They forward you what they call foundation monies 
based on a schedule of what they project from two years ago and what districts 
submitted their ADA or enrollment. They calculate what they need to send you 
and then at the end of the fiscal year in the following month in the next fiscal year 
if they overpay you they recover that; if they underpay you they make up the 
difference.  But in our district we had been relying on the overpayment to meet 
operations so I think the illusion of it’s OK was occurring because that 
overpayment in the neighborhood of $1-2 million every year but it was being 
recovered. The best way I could and this was a heated discussion with the Board 
was describe it was what if the Legislature goes to real time funding.  If they go to 
real time funding we will realize an impact of $2 million. It would be financial 
irresponsible of me to ignore that possibility. It may not occur but I’m trying to 
have the actions and decisions we make to take into account the buffer that could 
be gone from one year to the next and we do not want to put the district in a 
position where they are going to have to face that animal.  I think when we were 
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having those discussions this was a foreign concept to the board.  There was a lot 
of education that had to go on.  That was another piece that had to go because the 
awareness was not there.  My experience in other states is that you were always 
funded based on the enrollment of the prior year.  It was known.  Then if there 
was growth they had formulas that would adjust in the following years.  They 
were talking about real time funding in the other state and when I arrive here and 
being involved with TASBO and following I could tell that is where we are 
headed here because the state is trying to make up some ground and logically if 
they were to move to that they would avoid overpaying which they do more of 
than underpay.  I think that this was a turning point and coming to grips that we 
need to monitor that and that our budget plan from year to year account for the 
possibility of an overpayment. 
S.B.P. #2:  Well when we passed the bond it was the board commitment to not 
raise taxes for five years and we followed through on that.  Then with the drop in 
enrollment that first year the district spent the revenues that were expected from 
ADA.  The second year we realized it was a real problem and then the state 
withheld the funds.  The revenue dropped and there was decline in enrollment. 
Contributing Factors 
Interviewer:  Was error in predicting revenue or enrollment a contributing 
factor? 
S. #2:  Error in revenues…anticipating.  Superintendent is only as good as his 
staff.  They did not understand the overall financial situation…they did not realize 
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that they were overspending over one million dollars…error in predicting revenue 
based on ADA.  Business director left shortly after my arrival.  We were fortunate 
to get someone who really understood school finance. 
EDBS:  I think after looking at some of the data that expenditures were exceeding 
revenues…ADA versus expenditures. 
S.B.P. #2:  Yes, predicting revenue and enrollment were a factor. 
Key Factors to Regaining Fiscal Solvency 
Interviewer:  In your opinion, what were the key factors, which contributed to 
regaining fiscal solvency? 
S. #2:  I went into the Internet and discovered that the district was in very poor 
financial health and I knew it would be a very big challenge in order to bring this 
district around and I explained that to the board when I interviewed with them.  I 
told them that there were two things that would have to happen in order for us to a 
positive financial situation.  One, they needed a reduction in staff. Next, we 
needed to raise the tax rate.  They asked me to eliminate staff by attrition rather 
than reduction in force and to not consider a tax increase for five years from a 
date they had pre decided for the passage of a bond issue.  This bond package 
included $40 Million in bonds sold.  I promised not to raise taxes in the 2000-01 
school year.  With a commitment from the board, I could ask to raise taxes in July 
or August for my first year here.  Then I thought we would be able to survive OK. 
I got an informal audit from TEA.  I wrote a letter to the Associate Commissioner 
for Finance and Compliance three and half weeks after I got to the district.  I 
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asked for a prospectus.  It took 11 months…they shared some interesting 
information in their August 22, 2001 letter that led to the following: 
1) The institution of a Personnel Management Plan, which froze hiring 
and began a constant evaluation of positions.  This plan brought the 
elimination of over 100 positions in the district.  It has been 
tough…yet, positive as everybody got on board in doing what needed 
to be done. 
2) The development of a Financial Management Plan, which addressed 
the tax rate. 
3) In October 2000 I took to the Board a policy for a 5-year target for 
fund balance.  I might be gone; school board members might be gone.  
We will get to a $3.5 million-fund balance.  Revision of board policy 
because not achieving because of 1.2 million in pay increases. 
4) Monitoring of attendance for ADA.  We went back to build our budget 
with a projection of 4,700 students we cut $75,000 from budget.  This 
was absorbed at central office not on the campus.  We took this 
information to the board. 
5) There had been a misidentification of one million dollars in 
overpayment from the state. 
6) Review of the policies, which related to expenditures. 
Also, the following changes were outlined: 
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1) A change in accounting procedures in terms of sharing more with the 
board in terms of expenditures and board approval rates. 
2) The sharing more information with board and community in terms of 
where the money in being spent especially in contracted services up to 
$15,000. 
3) The reduction of staff in the business office. 
4) We chose not to have a reduction in force but rather elimination by 
attrition, which has amounted to 100 positions, which saved $1.3 
million every year. 
5) We didn’t eliminated programs though with did eliminate two prep 
periods at the junior high (academic teaming). 
6) We eliminated the staff by combining job responsibilities.   We 
eliminated the position of Director of Warehouse and moved those 
responsibilities to custodial services. 
7) We instituted a multi-year budget planning beginning in Oct. 2000 
with Board Policy addressing Fund Balance by October 2005.  We 
implemented a modified zero-based budget planning process.  Every 
director and campus principals must justified their budgets.  The 
Cabinet hears all requests. 
EDBS:  Obviously, we took a better look at revenue forecasting where our 
enrollments were going and making sure we came up with staffing formulas.  We 
said we couldn’t blindly say we think we need this many positions at this kind of 
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campus.  We actually came up with different staffing formulas as they were tied 
to budget development.  Based on your enrollment in the spring we will give you 
a projected staffing and you do not have to justify.  If you want more than this tell 
us why you need it and justify.  So our budget development has focused on 
looking at what above the formula they are requesting and why they want it.  So 
that helped us focus on what are the things above some baseline that are being 
requested so that it could be an overwhelming task at just looking at 100 percent.  
Because sometimes you run out of time; you get caught in the details; you don’t 
get a chance to look at the big picture.  Give them a guide and focus on the above 
base allocations that are being requested.  Of course, reducing staff through 
attrition is not what we preferred but that gave us the ability to say when a 
position became vacant; is this something that needs to be filled?  That gave us 
the ability to start chipping away.  When I arrived at the district I asked what is 
our financial system that we do our processing and data and what are capabilities 
of this system.  My experience at another school district was with a more modern 
system.  What I found in our district was a system that required intensive manual 
calculation outside the system.  I felt to be staying on top of these figures that 
were a routine and cumbersome process.  Somebody who had the ability to 
retrieve data from raw format and be able to make sense out of it through 
relational data system and even though I had the experience I did not have the 
time to devote to stay on top of that data.  At least it was a tool.  We had to build 
it into the budget and convince staff that there are options out there and you will 
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have to go through a learning curve.  But it will mean that you will have a tool to 
make your job easier.  It will be more automated, more decentralized and we will 
expect more from staff but it is a system that takes advantage of technology out 
there that has workflow profit.  They can submit a purchase requisition for 
example, recruitment action and you can monitor through the financial HR system 
and anyone who submitted they know whose desk that is setting on.  If all goes 
well, the superintendent can do all of the budget checks and go to the end and 
have a better financial HR system and it is true on the student side.  If your budget 
is driven by how many students are in categories the system you are using is very 
cumbersome.  If there are alternatives out there they may require some investment 
and training but if they are going to give the tools to stay on top of where your 
accounts are and they can facilitate you staying on top of your expenditures.  We 
are currently going through training to different system away from system that 
had been used here for twenty-three years.  We are going to something more “user 
friendly” and robust which is Skyward.  This is way to have the data we need to 
stay on top of the monitoring required.  They are expecting us to do more 
maintenance as far as submitting more stuff through the Internet so they can do 
their analysis in an automated fashion.  If we are given more to do, without more 
revenue the only way that you are going to keep current or possible stay ahead of 
the curve is to have better tools to do your job. 
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S.B.P. #2:  Revenue forecasting is the main thing for me.  None of that other stuff 
was large scale that we didn’t do.  We had a little bit of staffing changes, teacher 
wise.  The main thing was forecasting and realizing what we had to do. 
TEA Representative:  The superintendent must recognize there is a problem and 
listen to what the problem is and raise that concern to the board and then have the 
board recognize and say we have to do something about this.  That is the key to 
turning it around. This is an ongoing process.  Normally, it takes a district that is 
in this financial situation about three years to come out of it to bring it back to 
financial solvency where it is stable and solid and at that point that is a critical 
point in some cases more critical than at the bottom because at that point district 
as a whole wants to regress and return to the way it was when they were well to 
do.  So the board thinks that we have money in the bank now we institute some of 
these programs; the very programs that took them down in the first place; the 
additional personnel for example; the cost the expense of new curriculum or going 
back and adding more classes; more courses and so it is the wise superintendent; 
and certainly the business manager and the board make people aware that folks 
the buffalo is gone; we can’t go back; we are still going to be penny-tight and that 
is how we are going to operate from now on.  There is significant community 
reaction; we have seen this time and again; where we get these calls they want to 
go back now, my board says we got money in the bank; now they want to have 
their own pet program. 
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Utilizing TEA Tools 
Interviewer:   How were the fiscal tools of the Texas Education Agency used in 
resolving the problem? 
S. #2:  Well, the FIRST was used as a guide because basically I already knew 
what the FIRST was going to have to produce when I joined the district in July of 
2000.  It wasn’t in place but I already knew it and basically I used it as a guide to 
guide me on how many Para-professional support staff we had; how many 
teachers we needed; how many administrators, what percentage of the budget was 
going to instruction.  All of those things were built into FIRST.  So it was a guide 
that I used to get us to where we needed to go. 
EDBS:  The optimum fund balance goal, which was adjusted toward the FIRST 
criteria allowed the district to project towards the $7 million range.  We were 
right on the borderline.  Even though we were half way there the people saw a 
positive fund balance and now you can relax all the stuff you have been doing.  
Seeing that indicator and knowing that you are not even in the range of having at 
least one month of operation in fund balance as that audit.  That was saying to me 
that we need two and one half months.  Here is a criteria and someone from the 
outside saying you are not where you need to be.  So $3 million may seem like a 
lot but when that first rating came out we were at $800,000.  I think this year we 
will be hitting the mark we want to be more ambitious and have two and one half 
months because we want to be more conservative given the profile of our district.   
If the funding formulas at the state change we don’t anticipate being a district that 
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gains if anything, we will be a district that takes a few steps backward. Trying to 
keep in mind not what is immediate but what is out there on the horizon and being 
proactive approach and that is hard to sell when your fund balance is over $1 
million and your staffing levels are not what recent memories recall and they are 
having to do more with less.  That was the biggest one from that rating system. 
Summary 
Based on a through review of financial and audit reports, newspaper articles, written 
correspondence, and interviews with key informants, the following were found to be the 
circumstances immediately prior to and during the insolvency of the Uvalde Consolidated 
Independent School District: 
1) There was increase in staffing while the district experienced a decline in student 
enrollment. 
2) Overspending of an overpayment made to the school district by the state, which 
resulted in a negative fund balance account. 
3) Errors in predicting Average Daily Attendance (ADA) for the school district, 
which translated in inaccurate revenue projections. 
4) Difficulties in processing relational data in budgeting. 
5) Communication between superintendent and school board. 
6) There was a need for better and more accurate revenue forecasting. 
7) Streamlining organization and management using highly qualified staff. 
8) Stabilizing financial management. 
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The key factors identified by those interviewed as contributing to regaining fiscal 
solvency were the following: 
1) Restructure the financial management’s organization and hire a more qualified 
financial officer in terms of knowledge of accounting systems. 
2) Adopting policies to prevent deficit budgeting and deficit budget amendments. 
3) Implement procedures for data collection, review and submission to ensure the 
integrity of Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS) 
submissions. 
4) Purchase of better computer system in order to better project revenues and 
staffing. 









CHAPTER V:  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
This study described two school districts, which had experienced fiscal insolvency 
and have either become solvent or have made substantial progress toward regaining fiscal 
solvency.  The study sought to answer the following research questions:  
What were the factors that contributed to the districts fiscal insolvency? 
What were the factors contributing to the districts regaining fiscal 
solvency? 
Were the fiscal tools of the Texas Education Agency used in resolving the 
problem?  
The data sources for this study included the application of descriptive financial 
ratios for each district, PEIMS data, semi-structured interviews; and a review of 
documents.  The qualitative approach allowed for dialogue between the researcher and 
respondents and enabled the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of the fiscal 
problems of each school district.  The researcher addressed the issue of construct validity 
by using multiple sources of evidence including PEIMS data, semi-structured interviews, 
audit reports, balance sheets, financial reports, school board minutes, and relevant 
newspaper articles to establish a chain of evidence.  In addition, key informants were 
asked to review a draft copy of their cases for accuracy. 
Reliability was addressed by using a case study protocol.  Additionally, four 
descriptive financial ratios were applied to each district to further support the reliability 
of the study.  Findings for the school districts included in the study were presented in 
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Chapter Four.  The notion of Yin (1994) concerning construct validity is well served by 
the use of numerical ratios as a description of financial solvency and complements the 
anecdotal evidence of each case. 
Cedar Hill Independent School District 
Prior to the TEA ‘substandard’ rating, Cedar Hill Independent School District 
adopted budgets which did not reflect current district operations; had a lower than 
required reserve for economic uncertainties; allowed unmonitored purchasing; 
unapproved loans; and experienced greater than anticipated growth in both enrollment 
and spending.  In addition, the district did not have a detailed budget calendar nor did it 
do long-range financial planning.  There was also a lack of internal controls in accounting 
and a lack of position controls. 
During the 2001-02 fiscal year, the Cedar Hill Independent School District 
replaced the superintendent and chief financial officer. The new leadership inherited a 
budget adopted for the 2001-03 FY that showed a beginning fund balance of a negative 
$2,727,529.   The superintendent and chief financial officer set in motion a plan that 
communicated the crisis to the school personnel and community stakeholders and 
reduced the deficit to $1,061,422 by the next fiscal year. 
The key factors identified by those interviewed as contributing to regaining fiscal 
solvency were: 1) the establishment of a system of internal controls, 2) conservative 
budgeting, 3) better revenue forecasting, 4) following the recommendations of the TSPR, 
5) aligning budgeting and board policies, and 6) elimination of block scheduling.  
Additional key factors mentioned were careful financial planning, improved school board 
 
 138 
communications, and the support of the board and the community for the projected goals 
of fiscal solvency. 
Both the TSPR and the TEA ratings were helpful in resolving the fiscal problems 
of the Cedar Hill Independent School District.  The comptroller’s report and TEA rating 
furnished a clear and understandable approach to presenting the problem to the 
community.  The school district furnishes an excellent example of recovery in terms of 
leadership, recognition of the problem(s) and communication in the budgetary process. 
Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District 
The Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District experienced several factors 
which conspired to produce the circumstances prior to the TEA ‘substandard rating’ of 
2000-01 fiscal year.  These factors included the lack of long range financial planning, 
declining student enrollment coupled with increases in staffing, spending of a TEA 
overpayment in an amount in excess of $1,000,000, unmonitored capital spending and a 
lower than required reserve for economic uncertainties. 
In addition, there was a lack of communication between the superintendent and 
the board/community regarding the financial situation of the district.  There was also an 
overestimation of the growth of assessed valuation. 
The key factors identified by those interviewed as contributing to regaining fiscal 
solvency by the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District were the hiring of a 
new superintendent in 2000 who clearly recognized the fiscal problems of the district.  In 
addition, an Executive Director of Business Services was hired who had experience in a 
larger district setting.  These individuals were able to assemble a better financial model to 
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deal with better revenue forecasting, decreasing staffing through attrition, and the 
improved communication to the board/community of the complexities of the problem.  
Further factors included the institution of long range financial planning tied to board 
policies.  Modified zero-based budgeting was instituted by the administration to furnish 
internal controls and eliminate the potential for negative fund balances in the future.  This 
process addressed annual budgeting more efficiently at every level by requiring 
substantiation of expenditures. 
Conclusions 
The following commonalities emerged from the data in the two cases: 
1. Both districts failed to forecast revenues accurately.  Additional insights for 
interpretation of demographics information and state funding formulas would be 
necessary coupled with better computer software to organize data.  
2. Both districts overspent revenues in the general fund resulting in a negative fund 
balance.  This practice placed both districts in the TEA ‘substandard’ rating. 
3. There was a lack of internal controls in both districts.  Neither district maintained 
a business office that was organized and dedicated to the mission of fiscal 
solvency. 
4. Both districts are major employers in the areas that they serve.  Staffing cuts were 
made through attrition in both districts.  Fiscal solvency requires deep budget 
cuts.  Since 80-85% of a school district’s budget is spent on salaries and benefits, 
such deep budget cuts usually require reduction in force or the elimination of 
positions through attrition. 
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5. There was a lack of long range financial planning in each of the districts.  Budget 
planning was an annual rather than an on-going process. 
6. There was a lack of communication in each of the districts studied.  Both districts 
experienced a lack of understanding of the problem and its ramifications 
internally and externally.  The school board was not knowledgeable of the 
potential shortcomings of the overspending of revenues. 
7. The prior superintendents had not demonstrated a clear understanding of the 
financial position of the school districts.  They did not truly understand the 
relationship between student enrollment and staffing. 
8. Board policies and procedures were not written to address financial goal setting. 
9. Both districts experienced a need for computerized software system that would 
better facilitate the processing of relational data in terms of aiding in forecasting. 
Warning Signs of Financial Distress 
The two cases studied and the corresponding budgetary documents furnish a basis 
for the researcher to conclude the following conditions to be indicative of financial 
distress:  (a) declining fund balances; (b) failure of internal controls in a school district; 
(c) board policies that are not updated regularly and do not coincide with administration’s 
financial plans; (d) inaccurate revenue forecasting; (e) lack of a reserve for economic 
uncertainties or contingency funds; (f) a lack of financial reporting to the Board of 
Trustees; (g) lack of long or mid-range budget planning; (h) lack of fiscal leadership in 
the superintendency; (i) lack of knowledge of TEA funding formulas and (j) lack of 
communication to the Board and community of the fiscal ramifications and implications. 
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Means to Successful Recovery 
The researcher can conclude the following conditions to be favorable for a school 
district’s successful recovery from insolvency:  (a) leadership which was able to clearly 
identify the problems; (b) purchase of better computer systems which enabled better 
projection of revenues and staffing; (c) adopting policies which prevented deficit 
budgeting; (d) reorganization or restructuring of finance department; (e) obtaining 
competitive proposals for external audit services; (f) hiring an internal auditor; (g) hiring 
a highly qualified financial officer in terms of knowledge of accounting systems and (h) 
implementing procedures for data collection, review and submission to ensure the 
integrity of PEIMS submissions. 
Conclusions on the Utilization of TEA Fiscal Tools 
 The two cases studied provide a basis for the researcher to conclude the following 
concerning the utilization of the FIRST rating system:  (a) it was used as a guide for 
future direction; (b) it furnished an optimum fund balance goal; and (c) it prompted 
community awareness of the severity of the school district’s fiscal crisis. 
Conclusions on Decision Making Models 
This study focused on school finance through the lens of three decision-making 
models.  Financial insolvency represents a crisis situation for a school district.  The 
impediments to success include time pressures, political pressures, conflicting 
information and uncertainty.  School leaders must act within compressed time frames, 
high stakes environments, tough choices and unpredicted events.  In both school districts 
 
 142 
studied, the researcher can draw the following conclusions regarding these models and 
their implications through the information gathered.   
The most difficult step for each school district was the accurate identification of 
the problem. The leaders through the reflective mathematical analysis of data that clearly 
diagnosed the problems accomplished this initial decision-making step. The skills and 
knowledge was not entirely intuitive, but rather largely dependent on the ability of 
leaders to generate rational alternatives, which explained choices to the board of trustees 
and other stakeholders.  The rational approach did furnish the adequate framework from 
which to build measurable targets and monitor the economic progress of the school 
district.  Furthermore, the leaders within these school districts were able to establish 
priorities that were validated and quantifiable through the use of the rational approach to 
budgetary decision-making coupled with the rationally grounded TEA fiscal tools. 
The researcher contends that both the incremental and garbage can models did not 
provide the adequate infrastructure from which to diagnose the problems or facilitate 
change in an environment of financial insolvency. 
Recommendations 
It is recommended to policy-makers and local boards of education that: 
1) Boards of Trustees monitoring their adherence to policy and administrative 
regulation in terms of incurred debt, budget controls and staffing. 
2) Boards of Trustees furnishing explicit rationale and revenue sources to justify 
staffing and personnel raises. 
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3) Boards should direct the superintendent to take action so that ADA is more 
accurately estimated. 
4) Board of Trustees ensuring that the integrity of the budget as adopted in the 
open meeting is carried out as approved. 
5) Boards monitoring closely declining revenues and act accordingly in terms of 
budgeting. 
6) Boards requiring the administration to develop mid- to long-range financial 
plan to be updated annually that includes all known financial commitments. 
7) Boards carefully reviewing audit recommendations and monitoring their 
implications by the Superintendent. 
8) Boards requesting reports and/or balance sheets highlighting the financial 
position of the district from the School Business Official on a regular monthly 
basis. 
9) Boards are furnished with periodic review of cash flow statements. 
It is recommended for Administrators, Superintendents/School Business  
Officials that: 
1) Superintendents ensuring policies and procedures are kept up to date and 
formatted for use by the district staff. 
2) Superintendents adhering to internal management procedures and chain of 
command. 
3) Superintendent/School Business Officials furnishing workshops on budget 
preparation and procedures for principals. 
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4) Superintendents recognizing their responsibility for accurate prediction of 
district revenues through careful estimation of student enrollment and 
assessed valuation utilizing a historical approach. 
5) Superintendent/School Business Officials providing monthly updates to the 
Board of Trustees concerning the financial condition of the school district. 
6) Continued efforts in enhancing communication, which specifically opens 
channels of communication between the Business Office and other district 
staff. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
It is recommended that: 
1) Further research be conducted utilizing this research design and methodology 
with other districts in similar contexts with different enrollments to furnish 
generalization.  
2) Research be conducted which examines school districts considered both 
economically and academically “substandard achievement” ratings in terms of 
factors, which may be interrelated. 
3) Research be conducted which examines or anticipates the impact on school 
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1000 N. Getty St. 
Uvalde, TX     78801 
 
Dear Superintendent , 
 
The purpose of this correspondence is to request your permission to conduct a research study 
involving yourself and several other stakeholders in your school district.  The research project is designed 
as a case study of school districts that have emerged from ‘substandard’ financial ratings by the Texas 
Education Agency.  I am a candidate for a doctoral degree in Educational Administration at the University 
of Texas at Austin.  Your district was selected as a potential participant because it met the criteria 
established for this research study as a district that has successfully emerged from fiscal distress. 
 
 The following research questions will be addressed in the study: 
1) What were the factors that led to the districts’ fiscal insolvency? 
2) What were the factors contributing to the districts’ regaining solvency? 
3) How were the fiscal tools of the Texas Education Agency used in resolving the problem? 
 
In order to answer these questions two to three districts will be interviewed.  Examples of 
stakeholders to be interviewed for each case will include the school district superintendent, business 
manager, and a school board member.  Each participant will be asked to agree to a one-hour interview.   
In addition to the interviews, documents from the previous three years will be collected.  These 
documents might include the Academic Excellence Indicator System reports, FIESTIER information, 
School District Summary of Finances, tax information, debt information, School FIRST reports, annual 
audits, school board minutes, and other relevant information. 
 Your assistance in this research endeavor would be greatly appreciated.  Although there will be 
limited benefit to your district because of this research, the benefits to other school districts could be 
considerable as this research will attempt to bring out the best practices in finance and accounting 
measures.  If you have any questions or concerns I would be glad to address them.  In addition, I can give 
you the contact information for my committee members who could also address any concerns.  My 
committee consists of Mike Thomas, Nolan Estes, Catherine Clark, Martha Ovando, and Lisa Cary.  I will 














Cedar Hill ISD 
1994-95 to 2002-03 Budget 
 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 
Total Revenue $24,236,641 $26,771,184 $24,403,721 $27,791,558 $28,333,027 $34,103,655 $33,710,895 $43,243,639 $48,017,369 
Total 




($278,967) ($644,140) $380,516 $498,241 ($114,020) ($1,091,611) ($1,655,556) ($1,666,107) ($180,345) 
Begin Fund 
Balance* $1,155,214 $876,247 $232,107 $612,623 ($114,382) $362 ($1,071,973) ($2,727,529) ($1,061,422) 
Ending Fund 
Balance* $876,247 $232,107 $612,623 ($114,382) $362 ($1,071,973) ($2,727,529) ($1,061,422) $881,077 
Source:  TEA, PEIMS 1994 through 2003 





1994-95 to 2002-03 Budget 
 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 
Total Revenue $24,731,425 $29,368,842 $26,846,574 $28,762,988 $30,258,518 $32,169,752 $32,865,452 $32,158,345 $33,351,758 
Total 




($915,415) $653,521 $959,399 ($842,593) ($1,612,210) $122,499 $151,653 $578,550 $1,466,367 
Begin Fund 
Balance* $1,929,415 $1,014,000 $1,667,521 $2,626,920 $1,784,327 $172,117 ($49,618) $201,268 $779,818 
Ending Fund 
Balance* $1,014,000 $1,667,521 $2,626,920 $1,784,327 $172,117 ($49,618) $201,268 $779,818 $2,246,185 
Source:  TEA, PEIMS 1994 through 2003 
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